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Abstract
In-Cylinder Pressure Sensors (ICPS) today are close to satisfying the robustness, performance
and cost requirements for application to closed loop control and monitoring of production
automotive engines. Using the Robust Design framework as a compass, this thesis first checks
the evidence for emergence followed by tracking the evolution of the sensor component itself and
its application to robust closed loop control of the combustion process in internal combustion
engines.
After identifying the potential system level impact of the emerging ICPS technology, Sys-
tem Dynamic and Technology Strategy frameworks are used to find spillover triggers and to
recommend a number of strategic options to generate and capture value for integrated system
solution providers so that they can beat the very stable status quo that persists in the slow and
mature prime mover industries.
In addition, Chapter 2 gives a data driven method for identifying the Skills needed for
suppliers to realize the above recommendations. This method is based on collective intelligence
of 690 experienced professionals with 20 years of work experience on average from 40 targeted
companies, representing a large body of engineering and managerial experience in battling
complex engineering system hurdles. This approach is more effective than blindly copying the
prominent integrated system solution providers or OEM’s, because a side effect of long term
incremental innovation in the mature prime mover industry is that the underlying reasons for
their success is ingrained in their ”tacit knowledge” and ”organizational furniture” and hence
not explicitly understood.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”Prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about the future”.
–Nils Bohr, Nobel laureate in Physics
In-Cylinder Pressure Sensors (ICPS) have been widely used to improve the efficiency and
emissions of internal combustion engines. Due to their cost and reliability problems, these
sensors were not applicable to closed loop control of the combustion process in production en-
gines. Their use was typically limited to laboratory, calibration or development configurations.
Today, these sensors are close to achieving the ideal requirement of 98 % accuracy within the
temperature range −40oC to 250oC, 5 billion Cycles at a cost of $5 per sensor. If recent de-
tailed announcements by Audi, Honda, VW and GM are genuine, then the application of these
sensors to combustion control on production engines is imminent.
1.1 Outline of Thesis
This thesis has three main parts. Chapter 2 explains why the Robust Design Philosophy is
used as a compass for dealing with the emergence of the ICPS. It starts with a brief back-
ground by citing from published sources that includes the author’s personal experience. This
is followed by correlations and hard evidence for links between Robust Design and the biggest
systems engineering hurdles that complex engineering system OEM’s face today, based on real
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data and not opinion. There is strong support for Robust Design from excellent reputable
sources. However these are usually limited to one or few people’s experiences and not based
on experiences of a large pool of experienced systems professionals. Furthermore there are no
reference on how Robust Design ranks when compared to other frameworks. Here the author
collected a very rich set of data (690 experienced engineering systems professionals from 40
targeted companies) using a survey of companies working on complex engineerings systems in
Colorado to discover how Robust Design correlates to other competencies and hurdles faced by
companies in practice.
Chapter 3 focuses on the Robust Design Evolution of the architecture of the In-Cylinder
Pressure Sensor (ICPS) as well as the architectural impact on Engine Systems, by examining
patent literature and interviewing a number of R&D people that have influenced the evolution
of the sensor and its application in combustion control systems. This part covers various types
of ICPS sensing elements, their integration with other components inside the cylinder and
a number of leading products that are currently available on the market. This chapter also
deals with understanding the detailed systems impact of ICPS technology to Robust Control
of Combustion in production engines. This is very challenging due to the intense competition
between engine OEMs. Nevertheless, the thesis sheds some light on the systems impact of
these sensors by analyzing information in the open literature and a purpose made survey that
was sent to engine professionals working on either the technical or commercial aspect of engine
development.
Chapter 4 focuses on the dynamics of the ICPS technology adoption in the automotive
market, spillover into the similar Power Generation market, and technology strategy recom-
mendations for integrated system solution providers who want to capture more of the pie in
the slow mature prime mover industry.
There is a list of conclusions at the end of each chapter. But here is a couple of bottom line
take away conclusions that this thesis supports:
• The key to ensuring success in mature prime mover industries is the explicit understanding
of how to generate and capture the cost effective robust performance value that emerges
11
from the interaction of simpler socio-technical elements.
• An opportunity to learn from failures, or a good way to avoid them, is to gain structural
understanding of the dynamic causal loop relationship between the above value and the
value measured in dollars.
This thesis applies the following key approaches taught in the Systems Design and Manage-
ment Program at MIT:
• Robust Design Frameworks[16, 17, 18, 19, 15]
• Extraction of Information from Distributed Intelligence (Interviews and Surveys)
• System Dynamics for Business Policy[1, 2]
• Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ): Laws of Evolution of Technological Systems[16]
• Technology Strategy Frameworks[14, 20, 21, 13, 22, 23]
The remaining sections of this chapter provide the basic background to the emergence of
the ICPS Technology .
1.2 Emergence of the ICPS Technology
How do we know that the ICPS technology is indeed emerging? Note that emergence does
not necessarily imply market dominance over another technology although that is one of the
eventual possibilities with emergence. In this section we merely present enough evidence to
convince the reader of this emergence. This section is necessary because a significant number
reputable engine professionals or researches still believe that ”it will never work” or that ”you
will never see this in production” possibly due to the long time that has passed since the first
ICPS concepts tried to emerge unsuccessfully in the late 80’s and early 90’s.
Another possible reason for the skepticism is the issue of tacit knowledge. For example,
an excellent performance engineer may not see enough steady state performance advantage
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to justify an architectural change. But the advantage may be in the combination of perfor-
mance plus simplification or robustness of the architecture plus better dynamic performance
and shorter time to market. In complex engineering systems then, the overall correct conclusion
that emerges may be very different to those of individual experts who no doubt understand
their domain deeply.
1.2.1 The Dominant Design in Combustion Control
There is a huge amount of literature in the form of papers, books and patents on sensing the
combustion process in internal combustion engines dating back to the 1980’s. There is a clear
split between supporters of the ICPS and supporters of alternative sensors chief among which is
the Ion Sensor. For example, on the one hand, Leonhardt et. al.[24] expected that cost effective
durable real time ICPS:
”offers several advantages over conventional control strategies: improved engine su-
pervision; improved performance and greater fuel economy; improved driveability;
reduced sensitivity to engine component manufacturing tolerances; ability to adapt
to engine wear and aging, as well as to changing environmental conditions and to
variations in fuel quality; emission reduction; less calibration expense.”
.
While on the other hand, Gazis et. al. [25], in 2006, still question the high cost and long
term performance of the ICPS and state that:
”pressure sensors are used for research purposes, a target to be met rather than a
solution in themselves.”
They propose using ion sensors that are well correlated to the features of the pressure signal
inside the cylinder such as the peak pressure cylinder position and magnitude. Despite the
range of opinions, one can detect an overwhelming agreement among all camps. In the words
of Guzzella and Onder[11]:
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”The pressure of the gases in the cylinder provide the most direct signal available
for engine control purposes. Since the interpretation of this variable is a well known
tool in ICE research and development, numerous control algorithms based on that
information have been proposed.”
Indeed, the Engine Control literature confirms that, right or wrong, the Dominant Design
in closed loop engine control algorithms appears to be based on the cylinder pressure variable
that may come from ICPS or from another sensor or estimator that is correlated to it. The
concept of dominant design is very key here. Utterback [26] tracked the dynamic evolution of
several new technologies and introduced the concept of dominant design. He found that, once a
dominant design is reached, it tends to stay dominant for a relatively long time making it very
hard for alternatives to disrupt or survive. Dominant Design has some key advantages. For
example, we can get into almost any new car without specific instructions on how to operate
it. This evolution pattern explains why for example most laptops, cars, and bicycles have very
similar high level architecture. Clausing and Fey [16] track the evolution of the bicycle and
show that its basic architecture and familiar appearance was unchanged since the invention of
the free-wheeling clutch. There will have to be a very strong driver or disruption for anything
other than the QWERTY computer keyboard to emerge despite the fact that it may not be
the most ergonomic or logical design or superior design. By analogy, whether ICPS sensors are
used, or whether an alternative or virtual sensor is used that correlates to it, it appears that the
Dominant Design in understanding and controlling the combustion process is via the cylinder
pressure variable.
1.2.2 Recent Announcements by Audi, Honda and GM
One needs to be very careful interpreting announcements from engine OEM’s. In an interview,
a colleague at MIT commented that sometimes OEM’s announce a new technology that will
never appear and at other times, no announcements are made and yet suddenly several OEM’s
roll out a new technology within a very short period. He gave the Piezoelectric fuel injection
valves as an example. This point is well taken. The dominant logic being the elements of
14
surprise in a very competitive market.
Figure 1-1: The Honda iDTEC Engine [3] and The Audi 3.0 L TDI [4] pictured in SAE
Automotive International Magazine.
Soon thereafter, The SAE Automotive International reported on Audi’s next generation
3.0L TDI engine [4] shown in figure 1-1 that will be installed by mid-2008 on production Q7
followed by the A4 with Bin5, Euro 6 emission levels. Here is an excerpt form the article:
”... It was Volkswagen’s new, high-pressure common-rail 3.0-L TDI with integrated
cylinder pressure control and AdBlue exhaust after-treatment technology. Due in
production this year, the engine not only produces 176 kW (236 hp) and 500 Nm
(369 lbft), but is also claimed to be the cleanest diesel in the world, with exhaust
emissions projected at EU6 levels...An essential element of its ultra-low-emissions
system is its exhaust after-treatment system with AdBlue, which will play a major
part in achieving Audi’s target to cut NOx by up to 90 % to about 0.017 g/km
(0.027 g/mi) ... One of the highlights of the new engine is the use of combustion
chamber sensors that enable more precise regulation of the combustion processes.
This is the first time that such sensors have been fitted on any engine in the world,
claims Audi. No CO2 figure has been released for the engine, but it is understood
that Audi may try to raise the injection pressure even further, which would bring
15
potential CO2 and fuel consumption benefits. ”
SAE Automotive international also reported on the Honda iDTEC engine [3] shown in figure
1-1 as follows:
”Not long after you read this, a diesel-powered Honda passenger vehicle will enter
the U.S. EPA’s Mobile Emissions testing facility to begin its certification process
for the 2009 model year...CEO Takeo Fukui, his chief of R&D, Hirohide Ikeno, and
the young diesel engineers AEI spoke with at Honda’s Motegi proving ground and
Tokyo Motor Show last October are clearly proud of challenging Europe’s best in
the compression-ignition arena...To meet EPA Tier 2 Bin 5 regulations, currently
the world’s most stringent automotive emissions standards, and with an eye to-
ward the even tougher California SULEV (super ultra low emission vehicle) stan-
dards (the equivalent of EPA Bin 2), Honda diesel engineers focused on reducing
engine-out emissions through advanced combustion control, coupled with unique
after-treatment technology. Therefore, i-DTEC will feature a premixed-charge com-
bustion process known as PCCI. This is a diesel variation of homogeneous-charge
compression ignition (HCCI) in gasoline engines. Both processes require monitoring
and feedback of individual cylinder pressure for optimum operation.”
GM also announced the Cadillac CTS for 2009 production [27] and plan for the Opel Vectra
[28] where ICPS is specifically mentioned.
Now, all the above announcements are very specific and very near term.
1.2.3 Growth of ICPS Patents
Clausing and Fey [16] give a very rigorous framework and process for analyzing the evolution
of new versus established technologies. By evaluating patents in a particular way and linking
them to what they call the ”Laws of Evolution of Technological Systems their framework helps
to identify new strategic opportunities or pick winning technologies.
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Since we are only after showing emergence, a very rudimentary version of their patent
analysis approach is shown in figure 1-2. The plot compares the growth with of the cumulative
number of In-Cylinder Pressure-Based (in blue diamond) versus the total cumulative number of
combustion control patents (in pink squares). We clearly see that combustion control patents
grew very rapidly starting in the mid 1990s but appear to be stabilizing since 2003.
The secondary vertical axis shows the growth of the share of the ICPS (yellow triangles) as
a percentage of the total number of combustion control patents. Here we also clearly see the
exponential growth in the share of the ICPS based patents since 1990. Note the sudden short
lived excitement around 1985.
The patents were searched using Google Patents using the search criteria:
engine combustion-control -turbine
and engine combustion-control in-cylinder-pressure OR combustion-pressure -turbine
from Jan 1776 to Dec 31 of each year plotted. The term ’turbine’ was used to exclude turbine
engine combustion control from internal combustion engine. The search option for all Patents
filed was selected versus just the patents issued.
Again, Clausing and Fey give a much more reliable and rigorous method for evaluating and
ranking patents but the reader will confirm that the cumulative patent curves presented look
at least like an emergence.
1.2.4 Conclusion on Emergence of ICPS
This above arguments gave clear evidence that the In-Cylinder Pressure Signal is the Dominant
Design for probing the combustion process. Any other method of sensing, such as virtual sensors
via observers will have to be verified and validated by correlating to this defacto standard.
Furthermore, it is very hard to disregard the announcements by Honda, Audi and GM,
because they give very detailed production dates in 2008 and 2009 and precise model details
and emission numbers. The Honda announcement in particular is very valuable because they
have an excellent reputation for robust performance at reasonable cost and these are the biggest
complaints of those opposing the ICPS.
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Figure 1-2: Growth in the Number of ICPS related and Combustion Patents.
A rudimentary plot of relevant patents also showed emergence.
Now each of the separate pieces of evidence above is not absolutely watertight when con-
sidered separately. For example Honda, GM and Audi may be competing for the ”buzz” factor
or purposely trying to confuse their competition or continually ”testing” the market. However,
when we put all the above pieces of evidence together, we see that the next stronger evidence
is when these cars are parked in our drive way.
1.2.5 Why is the emergence of ICPS a Systems Issue?
Systems impact of new technologies was an item to be rated in the general Colorado Survey
in Chapter 2 that compares this to other system type hurdles that mature complex engineer-
ing system developers face in general. This item was also rated in the engine world specific
survey in Chapter 3. It is a system issue because the emerging ICPS technology fits in the
category of architectural innovation. Using Rebecca Henderson’s [14] framework for analyzing
innovations, the emergence of ICPS falls into the Architectural Innovation category. In other
words, it is not just a drop in replacement for another component. Here the core system ideal
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of combustion control is not changed but the relationship between combustion control and the
system components change drastically. To begin with, ICPS has the potential to replace knock
, misfire detection, mass air flow (MAF) and manifold pressure (MAP) and cylinder balancing
subsystems. In addition, the combustion process that was previously regarded as noise is now
being directly sensed and controlled via fuel injectors.
Since the architecture changes the robustness properties that is first and foremost dictated
by the architecture also changes. The ripple effects of this change on the system are significant,
so much so that the business model of OEM’s and their suppliers get affected.
Chapter 4 focuses on exploring this topic to see how component suppliers can move up
the food chain to capture more value as an integrated systems supplier. In both the power
generation and automotive markets, the engine OEM’s business model (i.e. profits) relies on
continually pushing down the component prices while holding on to the value generated by
System Integration. For example, a combustion control component supplier told the author
that a particular component may start selling at $12/unit but this is eventually pushed to
$2/unit in a matter of 5 to 10 years. Patenting is not effective against this price squeeze since
the market and pace of technology is typically very slow. For example in the fast High Tech
industry, very different to the automotive world, the inability to copy or find a way around a
patent for only a couple of years means that the Patent is in practice a very effective barrier.
Even if Patents were very effective, sustaining a predictable cycle of innovation to always have a
superior component offering is not only difficult but it fails since the slow industry goes through
relatively very few architectural changes with time.
Another problem is that OEM’s typically can push the component supplier with new tech-
nology for exclusivity for say 5 to 10 years. Here the component supplier will be unable to
dominate the market for that component while other players are fast catching up to provide an
alternative solution. Hence the only way to capture more value is by becoming an integrated
systems solution provider to the OEM’s but this is precisely what the OEM’s business model
itself is based on: i.e. the profits come from capturing value by being the system integrator
while squeezing the cost out of components. Hence, for component suppliers, moving up the
19
food chain to become an integrated system supplier to resolve this dilemma is very challenging.
This a very interesting systems and business problem that deserves attention.
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Chapter 2
The Robust Design Compass
”Intellectuals solve problems, geniuses prevent them.”.
–Albert Einstein
This witty quote fits extremely well with the main aims of Robust Design. Given that in the
domain of mature complex engineering systems (e.g. automobiles, aircraft, spacecraft, power
generation systems) we will never be permitted to deliver complex engineering systems that are
unreliable, the question is where do we attack first or which fight to we pick if we had this ideal
choice. Do we want to solve problems that we detect during Verification and Validation Tests1
or do we want to prevent them from occurring in the first place. If, we care about maximizing
profits or minimizing the time to market, then the answer is already given in countless design
or systems references such as the INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook [29] or Effective
Innovation by Clausing[16]:
• It is factors cheaper and easier to prevent problems upfront rather than what Clausing
calls frequent Build-Test-Fix Cycles at the tail end that has no guarantee of actually con-
verging.2
Now, in the domain of designing advanced control algorithms for fuel control systems, the
1Typically at the tail end of projects when many problems are detected.
2Although in too many instances in practice we somehow manage to get away with it, albeit by incurring
heavy costs.
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author found by experience that the best weapon was Robust Design. This is simply the
disciplined art of asking and answering the following question above all else:
• What is the sensitivity of this strategy, business plan, customer requirements, system,
solution or process etcetera to a normal or exaggerated variation in the relevant factors?
If for some remote hypothetical reason we had to drastically reduce management training to
just one single sentence, the above question would be an excellent candidate. One of the most
interesting new management books by Michael Raynor[20] has precisely this theme of designing
a Business Strategy that is insensitive to unpredictable variations versus crystal ball strategies
that only work by predicting the best possible future outcome. But this is just an opinion.
There are others with a similar opinion on Robust Design. This is comforting but Robust
Design has only penetrated a small percentage of engineering systems activity as confirmed by
Singh et. al. [18] who state that ”While recognizing the practical significance of robust design,
it should also be acknowledged that it has had limited depth of penetration into core design
practices of major industries. We estimate that the number of uses of robust design today does
not exceed 5% of the potential uses”.
5% is significant but not a strong enough evidence of the value of Robust Design. So this
chapter uses data obtained from a survey of local mature complex engineering system industries
in Colorado to find how Robustness and Reliabnility correlates with the biggest hurdles that
complex engineering system developers face and other systems skills needed to overcome them.
2.1 Robust Design Basics
The author got into the Robust Design frame of mind several years back by exposure to and
practicing the Robust Controls Synthesis philosophy that was developed by Doyle [30] and later
fully developed and reported in the standard textbook by Zou et. al. [31]. Despite the heavy
math, the attraction was clear: here was a proper grounded approach rooted in mathematics
with the objective of delivering the required performance for plants (or family of plants) whose
behavior is not known exactly but varies, i.e. where there is uncertainty in plant response.
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Shahroudi and Young [32] is among the rarely reported applications of this approach in a heavy
industrial mature technology commercial product.3
In practicing Robust Controls, the author was constantly pleasantly surprised by effects
that were not mentioned in the Robust Controls literature. Not only was the robustness of
the product much better, but the level of performance was also much better. This surpassed
the original expectation that the performance would be reduced to the basic ”good enough”
level since the difference would be traded with a gain in robustness. Other side benefits were
that the collaboration among the team members was much better and so was the number
of gain iterations and overall time and cost of arriving at the final validated product. The
next experience was even more surprising when we applied the same exact controller with the
same exact gains developed for the GS16 Turbine valve to the smaller GS6 valve4. It worked
great!. The ability to have a new controller for a device with excellent robust performance with
practically no extra development related to algorithm development was a new experience. Even
John Doyle [30], regarded as a father of Robust Controls theory does not talk about these side
benefits.
So where is the catch? What did we give up in practice to gain the above robustness. This
is the answer that one either hears directly from or can deduce indirectly from Robust Design
colleagues and literature:
• For sufficiently complex systems, ”Optimal Design” is imaginary.
Now when is complexity sufficient for the above to hold in practice?
• Almost any ”mature” complex system that is not considered a stand alone component.
The more complex the system, the more true the above statements. We can intuitively see
why the above statements may be true in the context of ”Mature and Complex Systems” (e.g.
Automobiles, Aircraft, Turbine Fuel Metering Systems etc.). These systems typically evolve in
3As opposed to a prototype or a lab setup. In mature industry, the dominant application of controls algorithm
technology typically lags the available theory by about 30 years.
4The GS6 valve has a different but similar style motor (i.e. different inertia, resistance, inductance) and
different metering section (different friction levels flow forces etc.)
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a slow to medium paced technology and market environment. ”Complexity” makes it almost
impossible to align the sweet spots of individual subsystems. ”Maturity” makes it difficult to
redesign and shift the sweet spot of every other component so that they are perfectly aligned.
Even if this improbable alignment was possible under one condition, then it will shift again
with aging, operational, usage or manufacturing variations etc. The shift can also be due to
incremental innovation or local optimization of a subsystem. The point is that in complex and
mature systems, (over)optimization make systems very sensitive.
This may appear to be counter intuitive. As technology evolves, we continue to gain bet-
ter physical and analytical understanding of physics and can measure significant performance
improvements when we optimize the design of individual components (e.g. software, controls,
electronics and mechanical subsystems). Yet, the overall systems appear to become extremely
sensitive to risks that are tough to predict in advance or handle when they emerge.
So in practice, for complex and mature engineering systems, one is giving up only a mental
state by settling for a ”good enough” or ”acceptable”performance level that holds for a very
wide range of conditions.
The converse is also true:
• By striving for optimal performance, one gains a mental state plus a brittle design and
looses actual performance that holds for an acceptably wide enough range of conditions.
The above observations have their roots in engineering. However, Carlson and Doyle [33] give
scientific backbone to the observations above. They use the term ”Highly Optimized Tolerance
(HOT) is a mechanism that relates evolving structure to power laws in interconnected sys-
tems. HOT systems arise where design and evolution create complex systems sharing common
features, including (1) high efficiency, performance, and robustness to designed-for uncertain-
ties, (2) hypersensitivity to design flaws and unanticipated perturbations”. They do not quite
present an absolute scientific proof for their findings but use a simple example mathematical
model of ”forest fire” to illustrate the very similar conclusion:
”Through design and evolution, HOT systems achieve rare structured states which
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are robust to perturbations they were designed to handle, yet fragile to unexpected
perturbations and design flaws. As the sophistication of these systems is increased,
engineers encounter a series of trade offs between greater productivity or throughput
and the possibility of catastrophic failure. Such robustness trade offs are central
properties of the complex systems which arise in biology and engineering.”
Note that Carlson and Doyle’s point is more subtle that the author’s point preceding it
because they are referring to ”Robust yet Fragile” so that even when we include Robustness
to known factors in Trade-off to improve output, we may still inadvertently drive toward a
catastrophic failure.
A final necessary basic knowledge on robustness is that it is first and foremost determined
by the System Architecture. With proper tweaking and tuning of parameters of a given ar-
chitecture, we can quickly reach the robustness limit set by the architecture. This is a hard
limit like a brick wall. You can spend all your company’s resources on testing and tweaking
the design parameters, but the robustness will not move an iota beyond this inherent limit.
Obviously the way out is to change the architecture to one that has a higher inherent limit.
• Robustness is an Inherent property of the System Architecture. Major improvements are
only possible by architectural change and not tweaking the parameters.
2.1.1 Robust Design Terminology
Here is an example of a robust starting performance of a car: An automobile that starts properly
every single time without failure regardless of ambient conditions(pressure, temperature), engine
temperature (hot or cold), fuel octane(85, 89, 93) or operator characteristics (patient, impatient,
lead foot etc) has a very robust starting function. Using this definition, the majority of new
cars today fitted with electronic fuel injection are very robust compared to 20 years ago.
Clausing [17] states that Robustness and Reliability are not the same thing. Robustness is
a subset of Reliability that includes issues like manufacturing or design mistakes. For example,
if Honda mistakenly delivers a Civic with a malfunctioning near dead battery, due to a man-
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ufacturing mistake, then we can still call the Civic design robust design despite the obvious
reliability problem.
A crisper definition of robustness5:
• Robustness is a measure of the insensitivity of a system’s response to reasonably common
variations in conditions that influence it
Clausing [16] and [17] calls these conditions noise and gives detailed examples and subdivi-
sions of the following categories:
• Environmental Variations
• Variations in Production
• Variations as the Result of Time and Use
2.1.2 Symptoms of Complex Engineering Systems that are Sensitive
This section is based on personal experience of the author. A comprehensive list of symptoms
based on inputs from 690 professionals are identified and grouped together into clusters in
section 2.2.
Robustness problems can be hard to diagnose properly because they do not necessarily show
up during component tests or under controlled ”narrow” conditions. The change in mechanical
properties of the space shuttle ”O”-Rings with temperature were most likely within spec and
never disputed at the the component level. Yet they were a real critical risk that was always
lurking in the system for almost 100 successful flights. Mature safety critical reliable systems
are required to have extremely low failure rates. But what if the failure rate is reduced from
1 in a million flights to 1 in a 10000 due to a robustness problem? The classical engineering
approach to solving this problem is very expensive. I.e. one needs a hugely expensive number of
tests to verify the reliability. Clausing [16] gives an excellent solution to this problem discussed
in the next section.
5Dan Frey, Professor of Mechanical and Engineering Systems at MIT used a definition very close to this in
an email to the author.
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So in the domain of complex and mature safety critical systems, Robustness problems
are hard to detect and emphasis is obviously on preventing them. But as mentioned earlier
only 5% of applications benefit from the Robust Design approach. So how do you know you
have robustness problems if your application is in the 95% group? This section gives typical
symptoms that highly correlate with robustness problems.
The CSU survey of section 2.2 showed that the biggest complex and dynamic engineering
system hurdle faced by 450 mature system engineers6 in Colorado was System Requirements
Ambiguity and Instability. System providers obviously prefer a perfect spec because that shifts
the majority of the risk to the customer. Requirements are also a matter of legal necessity to
allocate scope to suppliers of different subsystems and to hold them accountable. In this sense,
the perfect spec should be static, with a fixed scope with perfectly detailed exact description on
how compliance is to be validated. Perfect specs translate to perfect ”checklist engineering”. In
practice, there is no such thing as perfect specs or check lists. For one thing, check lists alone
are not rich enough to capture system interactions or dynamic information or flows or processes.
Most complex systems of interest have a very significant dynamic content. For example, a plane
has to move to deliver value that is heavily influenced by the price of fuel that most people
realize is dynamic and typically goes the wrong direction.
Another practical problem is that perfect specs require a huge amount of work to generate
huge amounts of documentation that no one really has time to read or uses fully. If a system
has a million parts, and each part is so simple whose requirements can be captured in just one
page, we have a million pages of text and check lists. So the tendency would be to read and
understand some of the key parts of the requirement and disregard the rest. At an INCOSE
presentation on SE tools [34], the presenter claimed that on very complex systems only 40% of
requirments are actually read by another person.
Yet the biggest problem with perfect requirements is that it assumes zero uncertainty and
shifts all the risk to the customer or toward the commercial end of the business. This side is
typically not as knowledgeable about the system details or the best ways to validate nor do
6in the sense of mature complex systems not age.
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they typically know exactly what they need before the project kick-off leading to a possible
expensive scope change. Even if all these perfect preconditions were satisfied, what do we do
when we develop the same product to sell to multiple customers? This gives us our first major
symptom of a robustness problem with the final System or the development process:
• Symptom: Extreme Sensitivity to and inability to cope with Ambiguity and Instability in
requirements. Or alternatively, extreme emphasis on deriving perfect specs or intensively
engaging the customer to review each item on a huge detailed list of specs
Other important symptoms that in the author’s experience appear to be highly correlated
with sensitivity or lack of robustness are listed below:
• Symptom: Ineffective Risk Management and the Inability to Identify and Bound Uncer-
tainties.
• Symptom: (Semi)Infinite Defect loop or projects that remain 99 % complete despite a
significant ongoing expenditure of resources.
• Symptom: Exponential growth in the amounts of Test Data or Verification and Validation
Expense despite a linear growth in the number of new products.
• Symptom: Ripple Effects: Seemingly small local incremental changes that cause a large
number of changes in other parts of the system.
Note that the above list of symptoms are very easy to measure. For example, by just
trending the data storage capacity allocated to engineering versus the number of new products
with time, one can quickly get an indication of whether there is an abnormal growth of data
with time. So the problem is not so much with the difficulty of measurement. The problem is
in recognizing multiple symptoms of a structural problem such as Lack of Robustness.
2.1.3 Why boil the ocean when we have Robust Design?
The ”why boil the ocean?” argument was part of a presentation given by Prof. Dan Frey
at the Systems Design and Management Conference at MIT in 2007. The holistic vision of
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Systems Engineering as given in version 3 of the INCOSE System Engineering Handbook[29]
covers every possible aspect of customer value streams, developing, maintaining, operating and
decommissioning the system within the full spectrum of Socio-Technical contexts by looking
at all the ”-ilities” upfront in the design process. This is obviously a huge task that can
grow exponentially with system complexity as the number of possible interactions between the
components (in the above multiple dimensions) grows exponentially. It is clear why this vision
has emerged. No doubt, by leaving out one of the ’ilities’ or not considering some essential
aspect or dimension of the life cycle of the system upfront, very large and expensive mistakes
were made that lead to the cumulative check list of issues to grow.
Unfortunately, this ”exhaustive check list engineering” approach is not only very boring,
it is also inefficient like ”boiling the ocean” or counterproductive like CAT scanning all parts
of all patients that walk into a hospital to make sure most angles are covered. Columbus did
not discover America by navigating every inch of space between Europe and America. He used
reliable navigation tools like a compass or star charts, a good team and available information
from others to accomplish the task. By analogy, we need tools like the ”compass” to rely on so
that we can find the desired system design without having to analyze all that is analyzable. In
addition, not all the areas of the INCOSE Vision are analyzable with enough certainty because
the problems typically fall into a wide range of Socio-Technical or Dynamic spectrum.
At the moment, in the domain of Mature Complex Engineering Systems that covers most
complex safety critical systems today (e.g. the Electrical Distribution Grid, Power Generation
or Prime Mover Systems, Aircraft, Automobiles etc.) where Robust Systems have the best
odds of survival, the Robust Design Philosophy appears to be the only well developed compass
at this time.
2.2 Strong Correlations with Robust Design
Woodward recently sponsored a System Engineering Chair with the aim of designing a new
Systems Engineering program that would serve the needs of the local industry in Colorado. To
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understand the needs, the author designed an Internet-based survey7 that was sent to technical
and commercial professionals who were asked a very detailed set of questions to identify their
type of organization, systems, biggest hurdles or issues and the skills that they believe are the
most important to their success. The survey benefited from a number of engineering directors
from members of the Industry Advisory Board of the Colorado State University who pushed
the survey to the relevant people inside their organizations. We received an excellent response
from 690 very experienced professionals (20 years of experience on average) spread among
aeronautical, power generation, disc drive, space and other industries with 75% that fully
completed the survey.
Other than the typical questions on educational background, experience, market and orga-
nizational details, the survey included 29 questions on the biggest system engineering hurdles
that the respondents faced. In addition, the respondents rated 30 critical systems engineering
skills and competencies that could be employed to overcome the above hurdles. A very large
number of respondents also added, in their own words, what hurdles and competencies they
thought were the most important. Their comments ranged from general remarks like:
”thank god someone is looking into this...”
to very specific opinions such as:
”too many managers are simply unqualified and immature technically and admin-
istrative wise. We have so many best practices for each organization that there are
a myriad of organizational requirements conflicts in best practices.”
or:
”Workforce is not trained to think in as a system, they think and act at too low a
level. The organization has not hired and promoted those with the right mindset”.
As the data poured in, a few key points emerged:
7The survey was reviewed by affiliated faculty and industry members who made excellent suggestions for
improvement. See the acknowledgment section for details.
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• The Database was very rich but the big variation in respondent backgrounds and indus-
tries made it difficult to extract useful information by directly looking at summary raw
data.
• System Engineering Hurdles appeared to form distinct clusters, analogous to medical
conditions that exhibit a number of symptoms, sometimes overlapping.
• Among other items, many respondents rated Lack of Robust Architectures as a very sig-
nificant hurdle and Robustness and Reliability as an essential System Engineering Com-
petency.
• The realization that the CSU Survey data was rich enough that one could objectively test
the quality of the Robust Design compass. For example, how does robustness problems
group into major hurdle (or symptom) clusters and how do Robustness and Reliability
competencies rank versus other competencies to cure these clustered symptoms.
The focus of this section is to find objective answers from the CSU Survey data on how
the hurdles (or symptoms) cluster together and which competencies (or cures) are essential in
treating them. This is uniques in the sense that most objective references on Robust Design
either speak from very personal or isolated experience, or they tend to mainly focus on technical
aspects rather than socio-technical issues where human, organizational and business factors are
also included. Furthermore, we know that Robustness and Reliability is not the only useful skill
for treating System issues and we would normally employ a battery of skills. Yet the author
is not aware of any references where Robustness and Reliability was compared versus other
approaches for treating different types of system issues.
2.2.1 Raw Data from Survey
Only the quantitative pieces of information of relevance to the question of Robust Design are
included in this section. The actual database also included a large number of personal responses
where the respondents input answers in their own words. For example 99 respondents described
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in their own words, what the biggest Systems Engineering hurdles faced by their organizations
were.
Summary Profile of Respondents
Figure 2-1 shows a very experienced population with an average of 20.2 years experience. It also
shows that Engineers, Managers (or Director), Systems Architects (or Analysts), and Project
(or Program) Managers were the largest functional categories.
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Figure 2-1: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Length of work experience and Function.
Figure 2-2 shows that the proficiency of the population is technical with moderate business
and market orientation. It also shows that the majority are in the trenches with strict deadlines
to deliver, or alternatively, this population appears to be highly loaded. The figure also gives the
educational background. The table in the figure shows the largest groups were Electrical(205),
Mechanical(196), Aerospace(119), Computer (or Software 85) and Systems Engineers (79).
There was also a significant number Business Administration (79) and Technical Management
(46).
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Figure 2-2: Breakdown of respondents by Proficiency and Education.
Profile of Organization
Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of the function of the team or unit where the respondents
work. Product Development(234), Design(106), Verification and Validation (85) and Testing
(39) were the largest groups.
Figure 2-4 shows that the data covers a full range of spectrum with regards to Pace of
Technology and Markets. The key mode of innovation is incremental(60.3 %) or Incremental
plus Radical (34.8 %). This is typical for slow to medium paced mature industries with complex
engineering system products that require a high levels of robustness and reliability that is the
main focus of this chapter.
Hurdles and Competency Data
The survey asked 29 questions on the biggest systems engineering ”hurdles” that the respondents
faced in their organizations, grouped into Human Factor Hurdle (HFH), Project (or Program)
Management Hurdle (PMH), Business Factor Hurdles (BFH) and System Factor Hurdles (SFH).
The tables in figures 2-5 summarizes the data collected on hurdles.
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Figure 2-3: Distribution of Survey Respondents by Function of Team or Unit.
Figure 2-4: Pace of Technology, Pace of Market, Innovation Mode and Resource Distribution
of organizations that contributed data.
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Figure 2-5: Rated Human, Business, Project Management and Complex System Factors that
form the biggest Systems Engineering Hurdles (or symptoms) faced by survey respondents.
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The Survey also asked 30 questions on the importance of General and Specialized Systems
Engineering Skills (or cures), to over come the above hurdles. Figure 2-6 shows the summary
of the ratings.
Several skills directly jump out from the figure 2-6 as essential. For example, System
Requirements and its close cousin, Integration, Verification and Validation were the highest
ranked general skills. Another example, it is very interesting and that Leadership that is not a
classical technical field, was one of the highest ranked Specialized Skill in Systems Engineering.
However, since several types of organizations and people are responding, one must be careful
about drawing direct conclusions from summary data because, for example the pool of people
who rated Leadership essential may not be the same people that rated System Requirements
as essential. Moreover, the two groups may disagree on what symptoms these skills cure.
Please note that the majority of question fields in the survey data within each main question
category were randomized in order to remove biases and reflection of the design of survey in the
responses. For example, when rating Business factors, the first question that two respondents
in sequence saw was Innovation versus Supply Chain Dynamics. Some questions did not need
randomization, however. For example, the education fields in figure 2-2 were seen by the
respondents in alphabetical order to make it quick and convenient to find their selection.
The summary data of this section is interesting and included for documentation of the data
and the survey questions. But the main question still remains: How do Systems Engineer-
ing Hurdles (or symptoms) cluster together and how do Systems Engineering Skills rank in
overcoming (or curing) these hurdles?
2.2.2 Statistical Cluster Analysis
This section first extracts clusters in the hurdles data using Principal Component Analysis.
Each cluster then serves as a correlated group of symptoms similar to a medical condition that
exhibits a number of symptoms by analogy. Cross correlation and Coherence techniques then
enable the ranking of cause and effect relationship between Systems Engineering Skills and the
clusters in System Engineering Hurdles.
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Figure 2-6: Rated General (Left Table) and Specialized (Right Table) System Engineering
Competencies (Cures) that are needed to Overcome the Hurdles (or symptoms) shown in figure
2-5.
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Principal Component Cluster Analysis of Systems Engineering Hurdles (Symp-
toms)
Using the SPSS software, Prof. Jim Zumbrunnen at CSU extracted the clusters shown in figure
2-7. The extraction method was Principal Component Analysis for correlation and the rotation
method used was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Component loadings higher than 0.5 were
highlighted for each cluster. Clusters 1 to 4 represent 12.2, 10.6, 9.5 and 8.5 percent variation
in the data respectively, so that they cumulatively represent 40.8 percent of the variation8 seen
in the data. In principle, we need 29 clusters to fully represent 100 percent of variance for the
29 Hurdles. However, once the significance of these clusters are plotted in an Eigenvalue Scree
plot, we see that the last 26 clusters become increasingly less significant.
The plotted numbers in figure 2-7 are the individual component loadings. Higher values
than 0.5 are highlighted for a quick visual pick of the most significant members of each cluster.
For example, in Culster 1, Trade-off between market, business and product architectures , and
Lack of Robust Architectures are the two most significant members of the biggest Cluster 1.
Please note that figure 2-7 is very useful for interpretation because:
• there is little overlap between the clusters and no overlap among the most significant
components that are highlighted.
• members of a cluster are spread across two or more categories of the hurdles. For example
Cluster 1 includes members from System Factor Hurdles (SFH), Business Factor Hurdles
(BFH) and Program Management Hurdles (PMH). This helps a great deal in finding
strong affinities across the categories.
Looking at Cluster 1 components in figure 2-7, we see that (PMH) Slow time to market,
(BFH) Trade-off between Market, Business and Product Architectures and (BFH) Component
Provider trying to become a System Provider to capture more value are highly correlated symp-
toms to (SFH) Lack of Robust Architectures. Now, executives may talk about the former Project
Management and Business Factors as real problems that their organizations are facing but they
8This is the percentage of variance in Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings.
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Figure 2-7: Clusters extracted by Principal Component Analysis of System Engineering Hurdles
Data.
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may not know that these symptoms may be highly correlated with the System Factors such as
Lack of Robust Architectures. Based on data from 690 experienced professionals, among which
a significant portion have Technical Management or Business Administration backgrounds, we
have solid evidence that these symptoms correlate better than others in the data. Further-
more, other Factors such as Experience, Knowledge and Productivity, a very typical focus for
organizations, are not related in a significant way to other symptoms in Cluster 1. So we may
for example conclude that a component provider who wants to become a system or a solu-
tion provider, would typically do better to focus on Lack of Robust Architectures (if there are
problems there) than Productivity.
Another interesting find in Cluster 1 is that Lack of Robust Architectures and Lack of
Optimal Architectures are in the same cluster. This could mean that there is not much differ-
entiation between the two hurdles in the respondents mind, i.e they may see them as the same
issue with different wording. Or it could mean that these symptoms coexists. For example, it
was mentioned earlier that when the author improved the robustness of the GS16 application,
several team members saw it as an improvement in performance and not robustness, the reason
being that the performance optimized predecessor, only delivered the best performance on the
bench and lost performance as conditions varied, such that ”good enough” performance over a
wide operating region of the Robust design in practice delivered higher performance than the
optimal design that in practice rarely ran at its best narrow optimal region.
Now ideally, one would have to go deeper to see if we can detect particular overriding
attributes of respondents or organizations. For example, it would be nice to find out the mix
of Manager versus Engineers that strongly identify with Cluster 1. However deeper analysis is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Only the following major take aways from principal component
analysis are required for this thesis:
• Four major clusters were extracted that represent 40.8 percent of variation in the data
• The components of the highest ranked cluster are very closely related to the topics that
concern this thesis, in particular, the thesis touches on the following items in this or other
chapters:
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1. (BFH) Component Provider trying to become System or Solution Provider
2. (BFH) Impact of Emerging Technologies
3. (SFH) Lack of Robust Architectures
4. (PMH) Slow Time to Market
5. (PMH) Trade-off between market, business and product architectures
6. (SFH) Impact of Incremental or Component Innovation on the Overall System
7. (SFH) Not Understanding the dynamic or long term consequences of business deci-
sions or policy changes
Cause and Effect relationship between Systems Engineering Competencies (Cures)
and the Four Hurdles (Symptoms) Clusters
This section gives the final piece of the puzzle, that is how do the individual skills rank with
respect to overcoming (or curing) each of the 4 clusters extracted by principal component
analysis in the previous section.
Figure 2-8 shows the four step process to compute the rankings:
1. In step 1, the data is first normalized by removing the means and dividing by the standard
deviation followed by purging NaN (Not a Number) entries that arise when a respondent
leaves a question blank.
2. In Step 2, the variance of coherence9 between each Hurdle/Skill pair is computed. When
we measure the coherence for a Hurdle/Skill pair we see that it rises and falls at different
frequencies. This means that the quality of the input/output or cause/effect relationship
varies according to the size of the groups that we use to sample the data. The variance
9Coherence is a technique used often in Control & Dynamics or Signal Processing. It is an excellent measure
of the linear (in the frequency domain sense) cause and effect relationship between input and output signals of a
system. For example, if the signal to noise ratio on the input or the output signal is low, or if the output pattern
looks too different and cannot be explained by a linear transfer function applied to the input, then the measure
of coherence will be low.
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of the coherence then measures the instability of the cause/effect relationship of each
Hurdle/Skill pair within the total population. Its inverse then measures the insensitivity
of the Cause/Effect relationship to how we group people or alternatively our confidence
that the cause/effect relationship holds across the total population.
3. In Step 3, we calculate the cross correlation coefficient of each Hurdle/Skill pair. Note
that this also gives a null hypothesis probability typically referred to as P-values, so that
correlations with P-values great than 0.05 are considered to be unreliable and ignored.
4. In Step 4, a merit value is computed for each Hurdle/Skill pair by weighting the correlation
coefficients by the inverse of the variance of the coherence, for correlations with P-values
below the threshold value of 0.05. Above this threshold, the merit value is set to zero.
In this way, the merit value represents a steady or stable measure of the cause and effect
relationship for a Hurdles/Skill pair within the population. An alternative explanation
is that this picks out strong correlations that cause the least difference of opinion within
the total population. Now since each cluster, contains a number of Hurdles, then the
rank is based on the average merit values of the set of [Hurdle1/Skill, Hurdle2/Skill,...,
HurdleN/Skill] pairs in a cluster.
The final bottom line results of this analysis is shown in figure 2-9 for Cluster 1. The top part
of the figure (the smaller bar plot) shows the Hurdles that belong to Cluster 1, ranked in order
of significance by their principal component loading value. So this part of the figure is a different
way to visualize the same information as in figure 2-7 for Cluster 1. Note that each item is
tagged by its Hurdle category for a quick visual pick of categories included in each cluster. These
categories are: (HFH) Human Factor Hurdle, (BFH) Business Factor Hurdle, (PMH) Project
Management Hurdle, and (SFH) System Factor Hurdle. The lower part of the figure is the new
information that ranks the System Engineering Competencies or Skills on how effective they are
at overcoming the group of Hurdles in Cluster 1. The System Engineering Competencies are
also tagged (GSC) General System Competency and (SSC) Specialized System Competency
for a quick visual pick. The way to read and interpret this plot is:
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Figure 2-8: Matlab Script used for ranking individual System Engineering Competencies
(Cures) to overcome System Engineering Hurdles (Symptoms) Clusters.
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• The largest group of like minded people agree on 12 out of 29 system hurdles (or symptoms)
to be the biggest issues their organizations faced. These 12 hurdles can be considered as
multiple symptoms of a single condition (or Cluster) because single individuals within this
group tend to rate problems that are causing the most pain at the moment or the ones
that have caused huge pain in the past such that they still linger in memory. Now using
the expertise of the total population, we can see that the Specialized System Competency
called (SSC) Complex System Technical and Business Dynamics is the most effective skill
(or cure) to overcome the group of Hurdles (or symptoms) in Cluster 1.
Now the lower bar chart should be viewed as a scree plot. So the top 5 skills together would
go a long way (or the biggest bang for the buck) to curing the Cluster 1 group of symptoms, and
they would be the best top 5 out of 30 choices. Please note that some bars are zero and some
negative. The zero bars are due to forcing the correlation to zero when the P-value is higher
than 0.05. The negative correlations in figure 2-9 are interesting in that it is not clear why for
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(SFH) Ineffective Risk and Conflict Managment within Complex Systems Projects
(SFH) Lack of applicable tools and principles
(SFH) Not understanding the dynamic or long term consequences of business decisions or policy changes
(PMH) Slow time to market
(SFH) Lack of System Models
(BFH) Innovation
(BFH) Impact of Emerging Technologies
(SFH) Impact of incremental or component innovations on the Overall system (e.g. ripple effects)
(SFH) Lack of Optimal Architectures (e.g. best performance in a narrow range)
(BFH) Component Provider trying to become System or Solution Provider to capture more value
(SFH) Lack of Robust Architectures (e.g. good enough performance within normal or wide range)
(BFH)  Trade−off between market, business and product architectures
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(GSC) Functional Design and Analysis
(SSC) Engineering Ethics and Legal Considerations
(SSC) Negotiation
(SSC) Leadership
(SSC) Optimization
(SSC) Manufacturing, Production and Operations
(SSC) Lean Systems (e.g. JIT, TQC, Continuous Improvement, etc.)
(GSC) Probability and Statistics
(SSC) System Test and Evaluation
(SSC) Finance, Economics and Cost Estimation
(SSC) Operations Research
(GSC) Systems Integration, Verification and Validation
(SSC) Optimization Methods
(SSC) Systems Reliability
(SSC) Supply Chain Dynamics
(SSC) Value Mapping from Creation to Capture
(SSC) Systems Project and Risk Management
(SSC) Risk and Benefit Analysis
(GSC) Business and Technology
(GSC) Systems Requirements
(GSC) (Large Scale) System Modeling and Simulation
(SSC) Software Systems Engineering
(GSC) Concept or Solution Generation and Selection
(GSC) Super system or System−of−Systems Issues
(SSC) Business and Technology Strategy
(SSC) Multidisciplinary Systems Design
(GSC) Systems Architecture: Function, Form, Process etc.
(GSC) Robustness and Reliability
(SSC) Organizing for Innovation in the Market
(SSC) Complex System Technical and Business Dynamics
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Figure 2-9: Ranking of System Engineering Skills (or Cures) for Cluster 1 Hurdles (or Symp-
toms).
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example (SSC) Engineering Ethics and Legal Considerations would adversely affect the group
of symptoms in Cluster 1. This is likely to be a reflection of the accumulation of errors and
inconsistencies in the data rather than a real effect. However, this is a mute point here since
we are trying to extract strong consistent positive correlations and not weak negative ones.
Figure 2-10 to 2-12 show the rest of the rankings for Clusters 2 to 4. An interesting find
in Cluster 4 is that (GSC) Robustness and Reliability is clearly a huge hitter regarding soft
Business or Human type Hurdles included in Cluster 4.
Furthermore, in the most significant Cluster number 1, (SFH) Lack of Robust Architecturesis
a top (Ranked 2nd) Hurdle. But it is not even in the list of Hurdles for like minded people in
Clusters 3 and 4. Yet this skill still enjoys a top position in Clusters 3 and 4.
Hence, the major take away of this analysis by looking across the results of the four clusters
is:
• (GSC) Robustness and Reliability is a TOP HITTER on a very wide range of Socio-
Technical System Type Hurdles that Organizations Face.
2.3 Conclusions on Robust Design
Based on personal experience of the author on implementing Robust Controls philosophy in
Woodward Turbine Fuel System products [35] [32], very reputable robust design sources [33] [16]
[17] [30], [31], [18] and analysis of a detailed survey of 690 experienced professionals with tech-
nical and managerial/business backgrounds in organizations that work on complex engineering
systems, the major conclusion or take away from this chapter is:
• (GSC) Robustness and Reliability is a TOP HITTER on a very wide range of Socio-
Technical System Type Hurdles that Organizations Face.
The subsection 2.1.2 described the typical symptoms of engineering systems that are sensi-
tive based on the personal experience of the author, such as:
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(SFH) Not understanding the dynamic or long term consequences of business decisions or policy changes
(SFH) Lack of Optimal Architectures (e.g. best performance in a narrow range)
(SFH) Ineffective Risk and Conflict Managment within Complex Systems Projects
(SFH) Lack of System Models
(SFH) Lack of standards or best practices or processes.
(HFH) Communication
(SFH) Lack of applicable tools and principles
(SFH) How to leverage software techniques (e.g. Waterfall vs. Agile) to lead and manage systems integration and testing.
(HFH) Organizational Structure
(SFH) Organization and Control of Distributed Systems
(HFH) Cultural
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(SSC) Optimization Methods
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(GSC) Systems Integration, Verification and Validation
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(GSC) Business and Technology
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(SSC) Value Mapping from Creation to Capture
(SSC) Supply Chain Dynamics
(SSC) Business and Technology Strategy
(SSC) Systems Reliability
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(SSC) Software Systems Engineering
(GSC) (Large Scale) System Modeling and Simulation
(SSC) Organizing for Innovation in the Market
(SSC) Systems Project and Risk Management
(GSC) Systems Requirements
(GSC) Systems Architecture: Function, Form, Process etc.
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(GSC) Concept or Solution Generation and Selection
(GSC) Super system or System−of−Systems Issues
(SSC) Complex System Technical and Business Dynamics
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Figure 2-10: Ranking of System Engineering Skills (or Cures) for Cluster 2 Hurdles (or Symp-
toms).
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(HFH) Productivity
(SFH) Ambiguity and Instability in Requirments
(PMH) cost or time overruns
(PMH) too many projects or too much switching between parallel projects.
(PFH) scope changes
(PMH) too much fire fighting taking away resources from current projects
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(SSC) Risk and Benefit Analysis
(SSC) Systems Reliability
(SSC) Operations Research
(SSC) Optimization Methods
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(SSC) Systems Project and Risk Management
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Figure 2-11: Ranking of System Engineering Skills (or Cures) for Cluster 3 Hurdles (or Symp-
toms).
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(HFH) Communication
(BFH) Innovation
(HFH) Productivity
(BFH) Impact of Emerging Technologies
(HFH) Knowledge
(HFH) Experience
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(GSC) Probability and Statistics
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(SSC) Negotiation
(SSC) Optimization
(SSC) Engineering Ethics and Legal Considerations
(SSC) Leadership
(SSC) Supply Chain Dynamics
(SSC) Manufacturing, Production and Operations
(SSC) Lean Systems (e.g. JIT, TQC, Continuous Improvement, etc.)
(SSC) Finance, Economics and Cost Estimation
(SSC) Systems Reliability
(SSC) Systems Project and Risk Management
(SSC) Optimization Methods
(GSC) Systems Integration, Verification and Validation
(GSC) Systems Architecture: Function, Form, Process etc.
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(GSC) Systems Requirements
(SSC) System Test and Evaluation
(SSC) Operations Research
(GSC) Business and Technology
(GSC) Concept or Solution Generation and Selection
(GSC) Super system or System−of−Systems Issues
(SSC) Software Systems Engineering
(GSC) (Large Scale) System Modeling and Simulation
(SSC) Organizing for Innovation in the Market
(SSC) Multidisciplinary Systems Design
(SSC) Complex System Technical and Business Dynamics
(SSC) Risk and Benefit Analysis
(SSC) Business and Technology Strategy
(GSC) Robustness and Reliability
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Figure 2-12: Ranking of System Engineering Skills (or Cures) for Cluster 4 Hurdles (or Symp-
toms).
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• Symptom: Extreme Sensitivity to and inability to cope with Ambiguity and Instability in
requirements. Or alternatively, extreme emphasis on deriving perfect specs or intensively
engaging the customer to review each item on a huge detailed list of specs
Dealing with hurdles that arise in developing complex engineering systems is in some ways
similar to diagnosing medical conditions that exhibit multiple sometimes overlapping symptoms.
The medical field has reached sufficient maturity where it is often possible to fit a number of
symptoms into a well known medical condition with treatment options that are agreed upon
by a large number of practitioners to be the best available option currently available for that
condition. By analogy it is reasonable to expect that we should be able to derive similarly
useful tools when dealing with Engineering Systems that are many orders of magnitude less
complex than the Human body 10.
The bottom line results given in Figures 2-9,2-10, 2-11 and 2-12 is an attempt to find
such a framework based on more than 12000 years11 of technical and managerial experience
in developing Engineering Systems. The proper way to use this framework is to match all the
observed symptoms to one of the four clusters by comparing them to the list at the top portion
of the plots. If a good match is found, then one can select the most effective tools from the
list of competencies as permitted by the available resources. For example, if the symptoms
match Cluster 1 exactly, the interpretation is that the symptoms match a particular condition
(i.e. Cluster 1) defined by about 80 professionals. In addition, selecting the highest ranked
skills will meet with the least disagreement among 690 professionals. Now if there is an ill
defined situation where very little information is available to choose the best approach, then
this chapter gave ample evidence that one would do well to choose Robustness and Reliability
because it is a top hitter on 3 out of 4 clusters. This study found other top hitters across the
clusters such as Complex System Technical and Business Dynamics.
This framework is not perfect. For example, one can argue that the options given to the
professionals are not clearly understandable or that different people understand them to have
10The Human Body is not an Engineering System according to definitions introduced by Joel Moses [36]
11This is the area under the experience curve represented by histograms in figure 2-1. Like counting lines of
code in software, it is used here because it is a very simple measure, and not necessarily the best.
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different meanings. However, this framework is likely to remain useful until such time that
a larger scale framework emerges that comes close to matching complex engineering system
symptoms and cures.
Finally, this chapter justifies why the Robust Design framework was the most suitable
compass for the main topic of this thesis: Systems and Strategic Impact of the emergence of the
ICPS technology, because the issues of concern are an excellent match to the issues of Cluster
1 where (GSC)Robustness and Reliability is a highly ranked approach.
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Chapter 3
Robust Design Evolution and
Systems Impact of the ICPS
”A small leak can sink a great ship.”
- Benjamin Franklin
”It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that
survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.”
- Charles Darwin
Franklin was primarily interested with Socio-Political issues of government and Darwin
studied the evolution of biological organisms. Yet, their conclusions have a great deal in common
with Engineering Systems where complexity affects robustness. If we drill a hole in a plank of
wood, it continues to float. Yet a whole ship made of many components primarily out of wood
is very sensitive to a small leak. Darwin’s quote is also very much in line with a conclusion
of chapter 2 that optimal designs (e.g. strongest or most intelligent) tend toward ”brittleness”
or low chances of survival. They only have to remain ”strong enough” or ”intelligent enough”
when exposed to large variations in conditions during their life cycle. Like biological systems,
the architecture of engineering systems evolve in the direction of adaptability or robustness to
change. The reader can confirm this curious fact that in a large number of patents, including
the ones referred to in this chapter, the stated motivation for the invention is typically to reduce
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the sensitivity that an earlier architecture or prior art is claimed to have to some critical factor
or disturbance1.
In the context of engine systems, the most significant factors are the environmental emis-
sion and efficiency regulations, fuel prices and the security concerns over reliance on foreign oil.
By tracking technology, market and regulatory trends, Bandevadekar[37] expects that major
architectural alternatives to the internal combustion engine (such as fuel cells) will not reach
sufficient maturity in the near or medium term. The OEM’s reaction to the changes is expected
to be characterized as incremental architectural innovation. To comply with the known and
expected ”changes”, Engine Systems are gaining complexity by the addition of more advanced
or optimized components such as multi-mode combustion, multiple (or flex) fuel, variable geom-
etry turbochargers, exhaust after treatment systems with regeneration, more complex injection
profiles, variable valve actuation etc. The added complexity and component optimization tends
to make the system brittle, but this is unacceptable as customers have come to expect the
highest levels of robustness and reliability from their cars. One way to significantly improve
the robust performance of internal combustion engines, with added complexities, is to use a
fast and accurate combustion pressure sensor to close the loop around the combustion process.
This leads to the following component and system level questions:
1. How has the architecture of the ICPS evolved to improve its Robust Performance as a
component? Section 3.2 examines the architectural variation of these sensors based on
information in patents.
2. What is the predicted architectural impact of the emerging ICPS on Engine Systems
within the context of Robust Closed Loop Control of combustion? What are the Synergies
and Conflicts between ICPS and other technology trends? Section 3.3 finds some answers
by analyzing data from interviews, patents, Internet based survey and recent symposiums
where various developers presented their ideas or progress on advanced engine control
1Altshuller’s TRIZ Laws of Evolution of Technological Systems (reported by Clausing and Fey [16]) is based
on rigorous analysis of a large number of Patents. The Law of Flexibility: Systems Evolve in the Direction of
Increased Flexibility is very much in line with this observation.
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Figure 3-1: Using In-Cylinder Pressure signal to Close the Loop On Combustion.
using the ICPS.
Figure 3-1 gives the Robust Closed Loop Control context of this chapter, where the engine
is supposed to deliver acceptable or good enough emission, efficiency and torque (or power)
levels everywhere within the known bounds on external sources of variation that include:
• Fuel Types (Diesel, Gasoline, Bio-Fuels, Synthetic Fuels, Natural Gas or LPG
• Fuel Quality (e.g. purity, cetane number etc
• Combustion Modes (Diesel, HCCI, SI) and transition between them
• Environmental Temperature and Pressure
• Load Characteristics and Disturbances
Other sources of variation such as variable geometry position of the turbochargers are are ei-
ther internal or external depending on the controls architecture, but must obviously be included
in the Robust Control context.
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This chapter is based on open literature, an Internet-based survey done by the Robust Design
Group at MIT, and interviews with experts on the topic of ICPS in the automotive industry.
In some cases, the information is not from a published source or an identified individual. This
was unavoidable as the OEM’s or consulting outfits that do much of the advanced upfront
engineering work for them, are not divulging any details. To illustrate the point, a press release
from Beru mentions that there is a European OEM that will employ their pressure sensor in
2008 on a production engine. But they do not identify the OEM. Meanwhile, by tracking
announcements (see section 1.2.2) we know that the OEM is most likely Audi or VW since
Audi’s design is based on the VW engine. So there are pieces of information that people are
willing to share in a conversation that they would not be willing to put down in written or
published form. In particular, the information in chapter 3.1 is not meant to be accurate as
the author did not have access to proprietary spec sheets from the OEM’s.
In his thesis at Chalmers University, Martin Larsson [5] gives an excellent theoretical
overview of various types of combustion sensors as well as experimental comparison of their
performance. Among the pressure sensors, he clearly favored the Piezoresitive sensor (section
3.2.2) over the Fibreoptic sensor (section 3.2.1). The reader is referred to that thesis for the
basics of various types of sensing elements and balanced opinions based on experiments as to
what sensor fits what application etc. So this chapter will focus on Robust Performance Re-
quirements, Architectural Evolution of Various Types of ICPS and their Architectural Impact
on Engine Systems.
3.1 The Requirements for ICPS
3.1.1 The Gold Standard on Performance (Accuracy and Precision)
The water cooled natural quartz based pressure sensors are expensive but as the data in Figure
3-2 for the Kistler 6061B shows, it remains accurate over a wide range of temperatures -40
oC to 350 oC. The practically negligible shift of only 0.01 percent/C is partially due to the
properties of the natural crystal and partially due to water cooling that keeps the sensor tip
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Figure 3-2: The natural quartz based Kistler ThemoComp Pressure Sensor 6061 B and its
Technical Specification from Kistler Data Sheet 000-020m-09.95.
at the same temperature to overcome mechanical expansion of the sensing diaphragm interface
with the crystal. Hence the cooling is not there to a avoid material damage. It is primarily to
keep the measurement accurate withing a wide range of cylinder temperatures.
3.1.2 Robustness, Cost, Size and Dynamic Requirements
Actual requirements depend on the exact details of how the engine OEM plans to incorporate
the sensors. However based on several RFQ’s, a sensor manufacturer told the author that the
performance is typically required to be within 2 % of the gold standard within a temperature
range of upto about 260 C. Figure 3-3 shows the Kistler Sensor 6056 A with the associated data
sheet that is intended for integration with the glow plugs. It is not clear whether this sensor is
suitable for production engines or whether it serves as an on board R&D sensor. Assuming the
design of this sensor reflects the worse case performance requirements from OEM’s who want
to close the loop on combustion, then this confirms that required magnitude of the shift within
the temeprature range is indeed of the order of 2% as compared to the gold standard that is
practically shift free. Another data point for the required temeprature range. Johnson[38] et. al.
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Figure 3-3: The Kistler Pressure Sensor 6056 A for and its Technical Specification from Kistler
designed to integrate with Glow Plugs via mechanical adaptors.
state the Maximum Mechatronic Temperature for Cylinder pressure sensing to be in the range
200 to 300 C. Hence, the robustness requirement of performance with respect to temperature
variation given in the data sheet in figure 3-3, is to some extent verified by alyetrnative sources.
Now the sensor is exposed to a large number of pressure and temperature cycles over the
life of the sensor. According to a supplier, the sensor is required to function for 150000 miles
that translates to about 0.2 billion cycles while Heavy duty or large industrial engines will have
a tougher requirement of 5 billion cycles. The sensor would then be required to not drift more
than 3.5 % within 0.2 to 5 billion cycles.
Now, as will be explained later in section 3.3, production engines typically do not have
enough room to bore another dedicated hole for the pressure probe. Hence there is a requirement
to integrate the sensor with some other device. So the size requirement depends on for example
whether the sensor is to be integrated with the spark plug, glow plug, injector valve etc. In
an interview, the ideal diametric requirements for a direct measurement was stated to be 0.4
mm or 10 times narrower than the Kistler 6056 A in figure 3-3 that is intended for an indirect
measurement where the sensor element is not in direct contact with the Cylinder pressure.
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For cost, the author obtained three data points. A supplier that admitted that their sensor
was lower performance gave an indication of US$ 12 that he expected would be reduced to
US$ 6 in 5 to 10 years under OEM cost reduction pressure. Another supplier with a high
performance sensor mentioned a price of US$ 20 and that his plant was being visited by teams
of engineers from a particular OEM to see whether they could optimize the production process
to reduce the cost to US$ 10. Another source in the US said that these sensors will never be
employed for any price higher than US 5. Now since Audi, GM (Cadillac) and Honda have
already decided to use this sensor on a production engine, then they are probably paying about
US$ 20 for a good sensor. However as sales volumes pick up and as OEM’s pressure suppliers
to reduce costs, these sensor will probably reach the US$ 5 to US$ 10 target for a much broader
appeal within 5 to 10 years.
Dynamic requirements again depend on the exact engine and the control technology and
architecture employed. The fastest physical phenomena inside the Cylinders is the detonation
(or knock) that typically manifests as a 5 to 15 KHz oscillation on the pressure signal for
automotive engines. The larger the cylinder volume, the lower the knock frequency. So to be
able to capture this effect, one needs a sensor bandwidth of theoretically at least 30 KHz2 (2 x
15, if 15 KHz is the max knock frequency of engine) to avoid aliasing problems.
3.2 Architectural Variety of the ICPS
The key to the gold standard in performance of the water cooled Kistler in section 3.1.1 is
that the properties of the natural quartz plus the water cooling of the tip assembly allows a
very Direct and stable measure of the pressure inside the cylinder. Direct means that a small
diaphragm is in direct contact with the pressure inside the cylinder where a sensing element
directly senses the deformation of the diaphragm. In this sense, both Kistler sensors shown in
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 are of the Direct type. Unfortunately, water cooling and natural or high
quality synthetic crystals make the sensors prohibitively expensive. For example, a complete
2In practice, higher than 30 KHz may provide more robust signal processing and better signal quality de-
pending on how the signal is actually employed to control the combustion process.
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advanced 6 cylinder engine may cost about US 3000 dollars whereas the natural crystal may
cost around US 500 for each cylinder.
Examination of ICPS patents reveals that the biggest driving force behind Architectural
Evolution of the ICPS has been the Robust Performance (or maintaining good enough accu-
racy with respect to large variation in temperature) and surviving a large number of harsh
combustion cycles at a very low cost and in an easy to integrate package. Surviving is also in
terms of performance degradation with the number of cycles or aging that is also a robustness
issue. Easy integration refers to a physical package that does not cause a significant mechanical
redesign of the core mechanical components of the engine such as cylinder heads or engine block
and one that can integrate well mechanically and electronically with the engine control system.
This is not an exhaustive list of all possible drivers, just the key drivers that have influenced
the evolution at the component level. System level drivers and evolution are discussed later in
section 3.3.
The response to the main drivers for the ICPS component has lead to the following branching
of designs:
1. Direct versus Indirect Sensing. As explained above, the Direct method of sensing is
closest to the measurand and therefore suffers least from temperature expansion effects
and dynamic resonance3 of mechanical components that connect the sensing diaphragm to
the pressure sensing element. Unfortunately this puts the sensing element close to where
the temperature variation is very large. Since the natural quartz is very expensive, other
type of sensing elements (such as synthetic crystal) or sensing physics has to be used.
There are several types of Direct sensors but the most serious contender regarding the
Robust Performance and cost is the Fiber-Optic based Optrand sensor explained in more
detail in section 3.2.1. Direct sensing is the most architecturally direct way to battle the
Robust Performance requirement. However, most architectural innovations and currently
available sensors fall into the Indirect sensing category where the designers have decided
3Low Mechanical resonant frequencies limit the useful bandwidth of the sensor. For high bandwidth, the
stiffness of the mechanical assembly must be high at low inertia.
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to re-frame the problem to battle some 0ther issue than the large temperature range. The
following list is ranked by the degree of Indirectness so that for example the last item is
the most Indirect :
• Indirect Sensing of Pressure: by moving the sensing element away from the hot
location and using some mechanical link to the location in the cylinder where the
pressure acts upon. Here a cheaper sensing element (typically Piezo-resistive or
Piezo-electric) can be used since the sensing element is only subjected to a fraction
of the temperature range as in the Direct case.
• Sensing of another In-Cylinder property and correlating to In-Cylinder Pressure:
Ion Sensing is a leading example with many supporters. Since the ion measurement
is affected by the conductivity of the mixture in electrode gap that is affected by
temperature, this type of sensor also has to deal with the drift issue. As discussed
earlier in section 1.2.1, the In-Cylinder Pressure value is the dominant design variable
for understanding and controlling combustion. Ion-Sensor suppliers therefore have
the same burden of proof regarding the robust measurement of the pressure within
the large temperature range.
• Model Based reconstruction of In-Cylinder Pressure: by using advanced controls
and signal processing algorithms. Here the pressure waveform in the cylinder is
reconstructed algorithmically by model based approaches that are either physics
based (e.g. Kalman filters) or correlation based (e.g. Neural Networks). This has
the potential for minimal architectural impact on the electronics and mechanical
design of existing engine systems as one needs only the existing sensors plus possibly
just one additional high quality sensor such as crank angle sensor. Unfortunately
however, the typical situation is that the level of Controls technology applied to
mature engineering systems lags the available control theory by about 30 years. So
using advanced controls techniques alone to avoid the need to use any ICPS sensors
altogether is a remote possibility, at least when it comes to mature organizations
that develop engine systems.
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2. Integration with another In-Cylinder Component: the lack of available room to drill a
dedicated hole for the ICPS probe on production engines has driven various forms of in-
tegrated architectures where the ICPS is integrated with another In-Cylinder component
such as the Spark Plug (for SI engines) and Glow Plugs (for Diesel engines). In addition,
such integration can simplify the wiring and electronic connections to the control system.
Suppliers typically have multiple patents and architectural variants for both Spark Plug
and Glow Plug integrated designs. The BERU sensor in section 3.2.2 is an Integrated
Glow Plug ICPS. The Denso sensor in section 3.2.3 is an integrated Spark Plug sensor.
The Bosch ICPS in section 3.2.4 is architecturally very interesting because it is an in-
tegrated Injector Valve ICPS where the same Piezo element used for valve actuation is
used for sensing pressure, representing a very simple and elegant solution to the problem
of integration, but the Bosch 2008 catalog only includes an integrated glow plug so not
clear when or if the integrated injector valve version will be available.
3.2.1 The OPTRAND Fiber-Optic Based Direct Sensor
The OPTRAND sensor is a serious contender for robust production grade Direct sensing of
pressure inside the Cylinder. The sensing principle is shown on the left side of Figure 3-4. An
LED shines a cone of light, via an optical fiber, on the inside surface of the sensing diaphragm.
A Photo Diode detects the intensity of the reflected light from the diaphragm, via another
fiber that sees the cone of reflected light. As the diaphragm moves to respond to pressure
forces, the cross section of the two cones is a measure of the distance of the fibers from the
diaphragm. So the intensity of the reflected light is a measure of the pressure force. The
right side of Figure 3-4 shows an embodiment of the sensor tip. The electronic components
(diodes, LED, signal processing) are packed on a quarter size circular disc that is connected
to the other end of the fibers at a relatively cooler location around the engine away from
the inside of the cylinder. The circuit produces a voltage signal that is proportional to the
pressure applied to the diaphragm. Now the optical properties of the particular fibers selected
are practically insensitive to temperature effects or electromagnetic interferences from other
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Figure 3-4: The fiber optic concept (left from Larsson’s thesis [5]) and OPTRAND Sensor Tip
(right from Wlodarczyk’s US Patent [6]).
electronic components around the engine. The inventer Wlodarczyk told the author some of
the early robustness challenges that had to be resolved architecturally:
1. Endurance of LED’s at High Temperature: The interfaces between the fibers and LED and
Photo Detectors were lossy, so the Diodes had to be run at high power to get enough signal.
However running diodes at high power reduces their life considerably. By selecting the
right fiber material and improving the quality of the optical and opto-electrical interfaces,
the optical losses were reduced. This enabled the LEDS to run at low power and increased
their endurance (hours) at high temperature.
2. Fading Diodes with time (aging) or Temperature Dependent Intensity from the diodes
or variation in power supply to the electronics: The measurement system had to become
insensitive to these variations in emission and detection of light intensity. This was re-
solved by having two photo detectors instead of one, where the additional detector was
directly measuring the emitted light. The measurement was then based on the ratio of
the measurement from the two photo detectors.
3. Fouling such as soot build up on the tip: this was taken care of by modifying the shape and
properties of the diaphragm and the way it was integrated into the sensor by integrating
the sensor tip in such a way that it still measured the pressure directly but it was shielded
from soot build up.
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4. Sealing: The fiber and the internal surfaces of the sensor had to be hermetically sealed
from the combustion products over the life of the device. This was resolved by choosing
the appropriate laser welding technique for attaching the diaphragm (tagged 18 in figure)
to the sensor tip body (tagged 12 in figure).
Optrand’s 2004 patent [6] explains that there are still offset and sensitivity errors due
to fundamental material property differences (Poisson number and Young’s modulus). For
example, in Figure 3-4 it is possible to get differential expansion between the tip body (12) and
diaphragm (18) so that the key distance between the pickup face (16) and the reflective inside
surface of the diaphragm become sensitive to temperature.
Another problem is unit to unit variations and the adverse effect on light intensity due
to sharp bends in the cable carrying the fibers from the electronics to the sensor tip. These
issues were architecturally resolved in a 2007 patent by Wlodarczyk [7]. Figure 3-6 shows the
evolved design in the form of an integrated glow plug sensor. The left of the figure shows
the short rigid (tagged FIG 3A) and long cable version (tagged FIG 4) of the device. The
electrical connector component (tagged 24 in FIG 3A, FIG 3B and FIG 4)also contains the
electrical circuit that contains the LED, Photo detectors and signal processing circuitry that
output a voltage that is proportional to the pressure. Other than integration with a glow plug
that is a standard component on diesel engines, the key architectural difference with respect to
robustness to temperature is that there are now three optical fibers at the sensors tip versus 2.
The additional fiber is the Reference fiber that is pointed to another point inside the sensing
diaphragm, such as near the circumference of the diaphragm. The Measurement fiber is pointed
toward the center of diaphragm. The bundle of three fibers is shown in sub-figure FIG5 in
Figure 3-5. The right side of the figure plots the signals that are returned by the Measurement
and Reference Fibers as function of distance of the fibers from the diaphragm. The measured
pressure signal is then based on the ratio of the measured voltage from Measurement fiber and
the difference in the voltage of the two fibers. In this way, the pressure measurement is based
on response of two points on the diaphragm alone and therefore not sensitive to differential
expansion between the fiber assembly and the diaphragm. Since the Reference fiber is bundled
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Figure 3-5: The 3 fiber version of the OPTRAND Sensor (left). Pressure measurement is now
based on the relative sensitivity of the measure versus reference signals (right) [7]).
.
with the Measurement fiber, they will have close to identical bending patterns and hence the
effect of bending on intensity is compensated.
To overcome unit to unit variation so that different sensors are matched exactly in their
linear range, during assembly, as the fibers are inserted, the assembler is watching the live
voltage signal returned by the two fibers and adjusts their exact positioning and the electrical
gains such that the two curves cross at their most linear part of the curve (tagged 42 in the
figure).
Figure 3-6 shows the integration details of the OPTRAND glow plug. The sensing ports
(item 20) and the channel leading to the sensing diaphragm are designed in order to avoid
build up of soot and other deposits that can affect proper operation within the life of the
component. Wlodarczyk believes that his sensor is the most convenient for integration because
the optical fibers are thin and very flexible and because the sensor tip is very narrow and has
the potential to come closest to the 0.4 mm ideal requirement given in section 3.1.1. The right
side of the figure gives the technical specification including a temperature sensitivity and range
that matches the water cooled Kistler discussed in section 3.1.1.
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Figure 3-6: The Integrated Glow Plug from Wlodarczyk’s US Patent[7] (left). Technical Specs
from OPTRAND’s web site (right).
.
Houben et. Al.[8] from BERU (proponents of the Piezoresistive sensor) compared several
In-Cylinder combustion sensing concepts. They rated the accuracy, stability of signal, output
signal and static pressure measure of the optical concept as excellent. However they did not
like the integrability of the sensor with the glow plug and hated the cost. But this was reported
in 2004 before the 2007 OPTRAND integrated glow plug patent. A recent conclusion that
was based on experimental comparison is from Martin Larsson [5] thesis in 2007. He found
the Piezo-resistive (discussed in next section) sensor to be most like the Gold standard Kistler
sensor in characteristics. He also found that the Piezo-resistive, optical and gasket type pressure
sensors would all have negative characteristics but would all be suitable for closed loop control
of combustion. Unfortunately, the determination of the robustness of combustion sensors was
not a specific goal of Larsson’s thesis so this conclusion is an indication but not watertight for
the purpose of this thesis.
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Figure 3-7: The Beru Integrated Glow Plug with Piezo-resistive sensing element moved to a
cooler location in the Cylinder head.
.
3.2.2 The BERU Integrated Glow Plug ICPS
From the cryptic company announcement, it may be concluded that the BERU sensor is the
one selected for the Audi Q7 application described in section 1.2.2 and so may be one of the
first to appear on a production engine and has the potential to dominate the European market
at least initially.
Figure 3-7 shows how the BERU integrated Glow Plug sensor fits into the cylinder head.
Note that the measuring diaphragm (tagged 5) is at to a cooler location outside the cylinder
head casting. The sliding heater rod of the glow plug (tagged 7) is responsible for mechanically
transferring the pressure force to the sensing diaphragm.
Figure 3-8 shows the measurement principle, the ASIC used for signal processing and the
technical specification. Like the optical sensor, the BERU piezo-resistive sensor can measure
static pressure and has low drift. The robustness performance at cost of the BERU sensor is
due to the following architectural features:
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• The Piezo-resistive sensing element is a Micro-fused Strain Gage (mono-crystal silicon
wire shown in Figure 3-8) that is hermetically sealed and has good linear characteristics.
It is glass bonded to the steel sensing diaphragm and measures its strain.
• Since this measurement is based on strain in the steel diaphragm, it will be sensitive to
its temperature dependent expansion. This was resolved as follows:
1. Indirect Measurement: Location of the sensor element just outside the cylinder head
sees less temperature range than when the sensor is closer to the combustion chamber.
2. The sensing element lends itself to easy integration with an ASIC where temperature
characteristics may be filtered or corrected. Reference [8] mentions that the temper-
ature signal is coming from the sensing diaphragm. So we may assume that the +/-2
% is mainly due to sensing the temperature of the diaphragm, for if the temperature
of the diaphragm was known perfectly, most of the temeprature dependent expansion
characteritic could be corrected for in the ASIC.
• The mechanical design of the Gasket/Seal and the components it touches has to be special
in that it must have low friction to not hamper the dynamic translation of the pressure
force and yet must remain tight enough to seal and protect the rest of the sensor from
combustion products. The joint BERU/Texas Instrument patent [39] describes an evolu-
tion of the seal in the form of a ”bellows-like” design that make the sealing function (or
the friction) insensitive to pressure changes.
Houben et. Al.[8] explain that by choosing the mechanical dynamic response of the heating
rod (item 7 in Figure 3-7, they can mechanically tune the bandwidth of the sensor. They
explain this as an advantage. The author suspects that they are trying to explain away a
disadvantage as an advantage. It is hard to accept that one would throw away the possibility
of filtering the signal in the available ASIC component (a reliable and cheap endeavor), and
instead purposely rely on mechanically tuning (i.e. redesigning) the component to condition
the signal. For signal to noise issues, it is best to have the highest stiffness and lightest design
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Figure 3-8: The Measurement Principle, ASIC and Technical Specification of the Beru Inte-
grated Glow Plug Sensor (copied from [8]).
to have the highest possible mechanical bandwidth followed by sampling and filtering the signal
in the ASIC component.
An interesting dynamic comparison of the Piezo-resistive versus the Optical sensor of the
previous section is that with the former, the bandwidth is limited by the sensing path to the
sensing element, whereas with the Optical sensor, the bandwidth is limited by the opto-electric
conversion after the physical sensing. If in future, it turns out that very high bandwidth is a
practical advantage, then the Optical sensor will have an edge. However, the cost advantage of
the Piezo-resistive combined with good enough sensor characteristics may enable it to dominate
the market.
3.2.3 Denso Integrated (Spark and Glowplug) Combustion Pressure Sensor
Patents by Watarai et. Al. [9] and Yorita et. Al. [10] describe Denso’s Piezoelectric based
combustion pressure sensing concept that can be integrated with the spark plug or the glow
plug. Figure 3-9 shows the integrated spark plug concept. Denso has also opted for the Indirect
sensing so the Piezoelectric sensing element, is at a cooler location. The pressure is then
transferred via a mechanical assembly to the sensing element. The Denso patents describe the
following robust design features:
• Indirect Sensing: Similar to the Beru sensor, moving the sensing element away from the
combustion chamber reduces the temperature range that the sensing element is exposed
to.
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Figure 3-9: The Denso Pressure Sensing Spark Plug from US Patents [9, 10].
• Bending versus compressing the sensor: Instead of a full surface contact between the
mechanical assembly and the sensor, the pressure force is first mechanically transfered to
a bending member so that the sensor senses the bending and not a direct compressive force.
The inventors claim that this reduces the unit to unit variation of sensing characteristics
and temperature sensitivity. Otherwise a perfect surface fit would be required at the
mechanical interface with the sensor using high precision manufacturing (expensive) or
excessive compressive pre-loading of the interface.
• Damping : Unlike BERU, the Denso patent [10] identifies the dynamics of the mechanical
assembly that translates the pressure force from inside the combustion chamber to the
sensing element as a robustness concern, rather than a structural solution to enhance the
quality of the signal. For example, the inertia of the mechanical assembly can pick up
engine vibrations or g-shocks that can show up in the measurement. In addition, this can
affect the pressure measurement in different ways depending on the temperature. Denso
claims to solve this by adding a purpose made damping element that isolates the engine
vibrations from the sensing element.
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3.2.4 The Bosch Integrated Injector Valve Sensor
Bosch has several ICPS patents such as the piezo-resistive sensor by Moelkner et. Al. [40].
This sensor is interesting because it appears to be a Direct sensor where the sensing diaphragm
is in the combustion chamber, on the back side of which is a thin MEMS thin strip containing
strip Piezo-resistive sensor. The patent is however very cryptic and does not clarify the most
interesting issue of how they propose to solve the temperature sensitivity of the piezo-resistive
strip.
Bosch’s other patent by Simon et. Al. [41] is shown in figure 3-10. Here the Piezo-electric
element that is used to actuate the fuel injector, is also used to sense the cylinder pressure.
This concept of integrating sensing with injection is very powerful because the combustion
mode that most benefits from pressure sensing (i.e Homogeneous Charge Compression Ignition)
needs neither a spark plug nor a glow plug. But an internal combustion engine cannot function
without fuel. In a recent IAV Symposium, Mehlfeldt from Daimler and Raupach from Bosch
gave a presentation on ”Possibilities and Limits of the Utilization of Inherent Sensor Properties
of Piezoelectric Actuators”. They explained that the piezo-electric properties that are suitable
for actuation (soft) are very different to the properties that are suitable for robust sensing
(hard). So it is not clear, how the same element can be used for both functions. However, if a
piezo-electric element can be developed with dual properties for robust actuation and sensing,
then this concept is likely to be very powerful as it has a potential to simplify the overall
engine control architecture by integrating the function of injection, ignition and sensing into
one component.
3.2.5 Other Sensors
The objective of this chapter is not to give an exhaustive treatment of all the ICPS patents.
There are other ICPS architectures. The idea for a production engine ICPS started in the
early 80’s. The 1983 patent by Kleinschmidt et. Al.[42] is an example of an early piezo-electric
indirect measurement concept. Major OEM’s or their key suppliers such as BERU, Bosch,
Denso, Delphi and Siemens all have a number of ICPS patents that typically span the range of
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Figure 3-10: The Bosch Integrated Injector Valve Pressure Sensor
integration concepts given above. For example, Ford et. Al. [43] have an integrated spark plug
concept that senses pressure by the strain in the plug shell.
Another example, according to a report in the Electronic Weekly [44], ”Toyota claims it
has the worlds first mass produced combustion chamber pressure sensor...”, where they fitted
the sensor to Toyota Carina E only available in Japan. It is odd that if Toyota already had a
robust production ICPS at a low cost in 1994, normal expectation would be that their engines
would all be fitted with this sensor and the emergence of the ICPS would be old news by now.
Perhaps their focus on their disruptive Hybrid technology had higher priority than improving
the technology of a mature engine system.
In his thesis Larsson[5] also tested a gasket type sensor that is on the cheap end of the
spectrum but concluded that it was good enough for engine control, although he was not
evaluating the sensors according to their robust design: i.e their insensitivity to key factors
such as temperature or vibration.
Kroetz et. Al [45] report new developments in the preparation and application of Silicon
Carbide(SiC) on Silicon (Si). This solves the dilemma of micro-machined sensors that also
exhibit good thermal, electrical and chemical properties so that microchip based sensors will
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become suitable for Direct sensing of pressure in the combustion chamber. In particular they
report data that show very flat response or robustness to aging, pressure and temperature.
Chen and Mehregany [46] tested a SiC capacitative ICPS and showed worse case nonlinearity
of 2.4% and temperature coefficient of 0.05% up to 574 C.
Wendeker et. Al. [47] use a fiber optic element in a different way than the OPTRAND
sensor discussed in section 3.2.1. Here the cylinder pressure force affects the interferometric
transmission of the fiber that. An interferometric decoder is then used to output a pressure
signal.
With the increasing availability of on engine computer processing power and capacity,
Model-Based or Virtual Sensing becomes increasingly viable. The best way to utilize mod-
els, whether they are physics-based (e.g. Kalman filters) or correlation-based (e.g. Neural
Network) has been to use a very good quality or accurate signal and infer other properties or
states that are not directly measured. The author found no example where a virtual sensor
was the primary element of a robust solution, i.e. robust solutions that rely purely on models
or models combined with very low quality sensors. But there are many examples of robust
solutions that combine model based techniques with at least one high quality sensor. Assuming
a good quality Cylinder Pressure Sensor value is available, there are references [35, 32] on how
model-based techniques can be used for virtual sensing of other hard or expensive to obtain
signals. Timoney et. Al [48] give a semi-empirical model that takes the Cylinder pressure value
as its primary input and outputs the NOx level that in tests showed a remarkably high degree of
fit (R2 > 98%) with the reference measured NOx value for a light and heavy duty diesel engine.
Now why use a model, when you can measure? Well, it is cheaper and can give transient output
so that for example, one could use this type of model for controlling the individual cylinder
emission levels directly.
Thompson et. Al. [49] give an example of how they used a Neural Network based model to
predict Hydrocarbon, CO, CO2, NOx, HC within a precision of 5%, based on signals that are
typically available around the engine. The least accurate prediction of the output was engine
torque. But torque can be very accurately demtermined by the cylinder pressure signal versus
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the crank angle, so it is not a stretch to think that better prediction of emission levels would
be possible by combining modelling with a robust ICPS.
3.3 Systems Impact of the ICPS
There is a lot of scattered information on ICPS technology on specific aspects of engine control.
For example, the majority of the ICPS patents referenced earlier also describe a few benefits
of the ICPS as the inventors see it. In addition there is a number of patents, papers and text
books that cover how ICPS is to be employed for a particular purpose However the information
is scattered in a large publication space. This section uses expert input via interviews and
an Internet based survey to extracts a high level overview of the impact of the ICPS and its
synergies or conflicts with other technologies.
3.3.1 Why Robust Closed Loop Control of In-Cylinder Pressure?
Engine systems have evolved as a response to continuous cost and regulatory pressures. The
evolution has involved both component optimization to mainly reduce cost or performance as
well as architectural changes to improve the emission and efficiency. The general trend has
been increased complexity and a larger number highly optimized individual components or
subsystems. The increased sensitivity of engines has lead to symptoms that are similar to the
generic list of symptoms given in section 2.1.2. For example, it can take an OEM 5 years to
a common rail system to an engine, where a large portion of the cost and time is in testing,
verification and validation.
The performance sensitivity of engines is already on the radar screen of regulatory organi-
zations. Zachariadis [50] reported on the tendency to ”tune” engine performance to the exact
testing cycle used by regulatory bodies for qualification. The discrepancy between test and
on-road Fuel economy was as much 20 % in Germany, France and UK in some years. The fact
that the International Energy Agency is getting smarter about performance sensitivity, implies
that it will be increasingly difficult to ”perfectly tune” the engine to an exact qualification test
cycle, at the expense of poor performance at other points that are not included in qualification.
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Figure 3-11: Diesel Control Architecture. (from Guzzella and Onder [11]).
All engines today can claim that they have in one way or another closed the loop on the
combustion. Guzzella and Onder [11] describe the architecture of basic Diesel and SI engine
control system. The former is shown in figure 3-11. The figure shows three feedback loops
to control Fuel, Air (Boost Pressure) and EGR (Exhaust Gas Recirculation). In practice, the
classical control structures rely heavily on Feedforward controllers. These are in the form of
lookup tables or equations, determined by extensive testing at many points in the operational
envelope. The Feedforward controllers do not affect stability and allow the Feedback loops to
be lightly stressed, so that one can in fact use cheap sensors and decouple the control loops into
separate concerns as shown. The issue is that as the engine complexity increases to meet tighter
requirements, it becomes increasingly difficult and expensive to solve the problem by using finer
lookup tables because the dimension of the problem grows exponentially. Even if super fine
resolution and highly dimensional tables were possible, there is a limit to the robustness of the
correlation between cheaper sensors outside the cylinder and the exact details of the combustion
process inside the cylinder that determines efficiency and emission.
Unlike lookup tables used in feedforward controllers, the real physics that governs the com-
bustion process at run time on a production engine is not fixed and less controlled than in
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Figure 3-12: The Engine Configuration Tested by Meiboom et. Al. [12]. The plot shows the
measured effect of Inlet Temperature (T2) on Cylinder Pressure at Zero EGR for a constant
Air/Fuel ratio.
the test cells used to derive the tables. Since the physics is very sensitive to a large number of
factors, the lookup tables grow exponentially to accommodate the increasing engine complexity.
For example, aging of the components, temperature, pressure or fuel quality have a significant
impact and have to be accounted for in some way. ICPS enables higher gain feedback controllers
to control the combustion process more tightly without having to worry about the exhaustive
combination of factors that the engine is likely to see in its lifetime.
3.3.2 Technical Description of the Problem
The report by Maiboom et.al.[12] provides an excellent backdrop for a technical understanding
of the robustness problem in controlling internal combustion engines. Figure 3-12 shows the
Diesel Engine with Variable Geometry Turbocharger (VGT) configuration that they tested to
identify the best control strategy for Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR). They employed staged
combustion, i.e. used a Pilot as well as a Main Injection event in each cycle. The right side of
the figure plots the In-Cylinder pressure trace as a function of Inlet Manifold temperature for
constant Air/Fuel ratio. The traces show that the Main combustion event after SOI (Start of
Injection) is more or less insensitive to temperature, whereas the Pilot Combustion event shows
some visible sensitivity to temperature. These traces are for zero recirculation, i.e. the EGR
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Figure 3-13: The Effect of EGR on Combustion Pressure at two operating points. (Copied
from Meiboom et. Al. [12]).
valve is closed at a fixed operating point defined by Engine Speed, Rail Pressure, Pilot Injection
Quantity, Main Injection Quantity, SOI Pilot, SOI Main, Manifold Pressure and IMEP.
However, it turns out that the situation is very sensitive to the EGR Valve position. Left
side of figure 3-13 is the measured traces for the same operating point for different values of
EGR. Here both the Pilot and Main combustion events are very significantly influenced by
the EGR valve, although the Pilot event is still more sensitive. The right side of the figure
shows what happens at a different operating point. Here the situation is reversed and the Main
Combustion event is visibly a lot more sensitive to the effect of EGR valve position. Even more
interesting is that the sensitivity to EGR changes direction from one to the next operating
point, i.e. at the first operating point, an increase in EGR tends to increase cylinder pressure
whereas at the second operating operating this effect is reversed. Note that these pressure
traces are not fixed. For example, component wear or modifying the strategy for controlling
the boost pressure will significantly change the traces. Even if there is no wear or change in
boost control, there is no guarantee of an even distribution of recirculated gas between different
cylinders. So, effectively each cylinder is running at a different EGR ratio. Furthermore, there
are other significant sources of variation, such as environmental pressure, temperature, fuel type
(in case of multi-fuel engines), fuel quality,cylinder-to-cylinder variation, and even seemingly
remote effects such as the increasing congestion in traffic. This example illustrates the key point
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that:
• As engine architectures become complexer to respond to regulatory efficiency and emission
regulations, there emerges higher dimensional and more sensitive system level behavior.
This increases the need for Robust Closed Loop Control of Combustion.
The main purpose of the engine is to reliably deliver the required torque while maintaining
acceptable efficiency (i.e. Fuel Consumption) and emission (i.e. NOx, CO, HC, PM etc.) levels
within the normal expected variation in influencing factors. Note the word ”optimal” was
purposely missing from this explanation. Torque and efficiency are directly related to the ICPS
trace. As explained earlier in section 1.2.1, there are numerous publications (e.g. Guzzella and
Onder [11]) that show that one can easily relate the combustion pressure to heat release rate
and emissions produced at the source inside the cylinder. Since the ICPS signal is a measure of
Torque, Efficiency and Emission levels, then the combustion robustness problem can be simply
stated as follows:
• The Combustion Robustness Problem: the Combustion Pressure Trace of Each Individ-
ual Cylinder is Sensitive to Unit-to-Unit, Cycle-to-Cycle, Fuel, Environmental, Wear,
Operating Point and Complexity variations.
Carlucci st. al.[51] is another source that illustrates the robustness problem. They showed
the combustion sensitivity of a dual-fuel diesel-natural gas engine to operating point, injection
pressure and injected quantity. The above statement on the problem has a detection corollary:
• The Combustion Anomaly Detection: Combustion Anomalies show up on the Combustion
Pressure Trace4
Internal combustion engines are mature systems. Their core mechanical architectures are
already highly evolved. See for example the robust design evolution of Engine Cylinder Heads
4As discussed earlier, the combustion pressure variable is the dominant variable for combustion. This does not
imply that alternative sensors cannot detect combustion anomalies. However, this does imply that alternative
sensors have to show a robust correlation to the combustion pressure trace or its features.
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Figure 3-14: Purpose of closing the loop on combustion is to reduce the dispersion of Smoke,
HC, Air/Fuel Ratio and NOx etc. into a small beneficial target region.
reported by Gomez[19]. The maturity of the mechanical design of the core implies that further
optimizing the material properties, tolerances or minor mechanical improvement of the engine
core components (e.g. the Cylinder Head, Engine Block, Crank Shaft etc.) are in isolation not
the best or easiest way to meet the ever tightening emission, efficiency and safety requirements.
Instead, the trend is to add complexity by optimizing or adding new subsystems or components
such as Variable Geometry or Multistage Turbochargers, EGR, Complex Injection Profiles,
New Combustion Modes (HCCI, PCCI), Diesel Particulate Filter etc. This gives rise to the
robustness problem that was technically described above. An emerging trend to resolve this
is by closing the loop on the combustion of individual cylinders and ensuring that it tracks a
reference or target profile:
• The Robust combustions Control Solution: Maintains the Combustion Pressure Trace of
Each Cylinder Acceptably Close to a (variable)Reference or Target While the Engine is
Subjected to Variation in Influencing Factors Within Expected Bounds.
John Pinson’s[52] presentation at the DEER conference in Detroit is an excellent example
of looking at the combustion problem from a robustness perspective. He focused the PCCI
(Premixed Charge compression Ignition) combustion mode of Diesel Engines. He listed the
major sources of variation responsible for the ”dispersion” in emission and noise levels: Mass Air
Flow Sensor, Injector Variability, Compression Ratio, EGR Distribution, Fuel Quality (Cetane),
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Environmental Factors and Wear. Figure 3-14 shows that by closing the loop on the combustion
pressure, he was able to significantly reduce the dispersion of NOx, Smoke, Air/Fuel Ratio, HC
(shown with hollow data markers) onto a small target area (shown with solid data markers).
There are several detailed variants of combustion control using the combustion pressure
sensor in patents and technical publications. The recent majority are focused on the new
combustion modes of interest: HCCI (Homogeneous Charge compression Ignition) and PCCI
(Premixed Charge Compression Ignition) combustion modes. These modes are tougher to
control than the classical Spark Ignited gasoline or Diesel engine because the combustion starts
spontaneously in various locations in the combustion chamber without directly triggering the
combustion by a spark or an injection event. Bengtsson et. al. [53] compare various combustion
parameter candidates to close the loop on CA50 (Crank Angle at 50% Combustion) for HCCI
combustion. Lee et. al. [54] do a similar comparative study for closing the loop on the SOC
(Start of Combustion) for a Diesel engine that is classically open loop controlled by the injection
events.
Recent patents by GM[55, 56], Caterpillar[57, 58], Bosch[59], Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(MHI)[60], Honda[61] and Ricardo[62] are but a few recent example architectures that the
patent holders may use to robustly close the loop on combustion using the ICPS. These patents
use different terminologies, but without exception, point to overcoming the sensitivity of the
combustion process in engines, in line with the Combustion Robustness Problem, Combustion
Anomaly Detection and Robust Combustion Control Solution statements of this section.
3.3.3 System Architectural Benefits, Synergies, Conflicts and Hurdles
The ICPS component and engine control patents referenced in this thesis describe the problem
with the prior art in terms of their sensitivity or shortcomings, followed by describing a solution
that overcomes the problems. So by picking a large enough pool of relevant patents one can
extract the expected system architectural benefits of the ICPS technology, together with how
it may synergyize or conflict with other technologies. Unfortunately, this approach can lead
to very large lists of items, without an evaluation of their relative importance. The author
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attempted to resolve this in two steps:
1. Step 1: Interview with 4 experts to make a short list. The 4 experts had the following
job functions: Engine System Engineer (Woodward), ICPS component Developer and
Business Owner (OPTRAND), Engine Component Sales (Siemens), retired Engine R+D
Manager (Arvin Merritor) and Exhaust System R+D Manager(Eaton).
2. Step 2: Internet-based survey sent to other experts to estimate the importance of items
in the above short list.
The second step was not as successful as the author had hoped as only 21 experts completed
the Internet-based survey in contrast to the 690 respondents from a wide range of backgrounds
that completed the CSU Survey reported in section 2.2. The author identified the following
simple reasons for the low response, although there may have been deeper or more complex
reasons:
1. Inability to recruit high to mid level directors at engine OEM’s, engine system suppliers,
or consulting groups to push the survey through their organization. They obviously had
more urgent issues to attend to. There was also not enough energy or time left to peruse
them.
2. Some well known experts that are well connected to the engine industry were extremely
skeptical any information can come from a survey.
3. Robust Design Problem! It turned out that many companies block Java content in their
Internet access. For example, people at Eaton and Bosch reported that they were unable
to complete the survey in the office. We initially decided to use Java for its more opti-
mal features in recording user interaction. However, this solution was not robust to the
interaction modes allowed at the targeted companies.
Hence the list of items that describe the Benefits, Synergy, Conflicts and Hurdles are reliable
because they are extracted from a large pool of patents and reviewed by experts. However, the
rating of the items based on the survey results is only an indication because 21 data points
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is not large enough to run meaningful cluster analysis to find the main clusters of opinions
etc. Furthermore, only 11 people supplied a clearly identifiable email address so the number of
unique individuals that responded is uncertain between 11 and 21.
The background profile of the 21 respondents were:
• 9 people had a technical background.
• 7 people had a joint technical/business (or arts) background.
• 3 people had a business or social science background.
• 2 people had other background.
The market segment profile of the 21 respondents were:
• 7 people worked in the On-Highway.
• 6 people worked in at least 2 market segments.
• 4 people worked in the Off-Highway segment.
• 2 people worked in the Power Generation segment.
• 1 person worked in the Environmental Policy segment.
• 1 person worked in other segment.
The interest profile of the 21 respondents were:
• 5 people were primarily interested in the Environmental and Policy Aspect of Engine
Systems.
• 10 people were primarily interested in the Technology Aspect of Engine Systems.
• 2 people were primarily interested in the Business Aspect of Engine Systems.
• 4 people were primarily interested in Other Aspects.
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Eight respondents made original contributions in the areas of Air Control, Ignition Control,
Exhaust Control, Control Algorithms and Systems Integration. They were asked how long it
took before their contribution was copied or diffused into another domain. The average of their
inputs was just over 4 years.
Eight respondents said that they modified their own engines. Three of these did the their
own scheduled maintenance and the rest actually modified the Air, Fuel Ignition or the Exhaust
path.
In the following sections, the most important items are emphasized with the number of
votes added in brackets.
Summary of Benefits
What are the key benefits of Robust Closed Loop Control of Internal Combustion Engines using
ICPS?
• Better Cylinder-to-Cylinder Balancing(9)
• Reducing Cycle-to-Cycle Variation in Combustion in Each Cylinder(8)
• Reducing Emissions (NOx, Greenhouse Gases, Unburnt Hydrocarbons etc.)(7)
• Detection and Avoidance of Misfires(7)
• Detection and Avoidance of Engine Knock(6)
• Improving Efficiency (e.g. Fuel Consumption)(5)
• Faster Time to Market (i.e. cost and time benefits)(4)
• Reducing Engine Noise(4)
• Easier Calibration(3)
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Application Domain
What automotive area is going to benefit most from in-cylinder pressure measurement? What
is the Primary Core competency required for this application?
• Diesel + HCCI
– System Integration (6)
– Innovative Technology (5)
• Gasoline + HCCI
– System Integration (2)
– Innovative Technology (2)
Synergy with other technologies or components
What other key technologies need to be utilized or co-developed to take full advantage of the
emerging ICPS technologies?
• System Integration (7)
– Better Communication/Bus Protocols
– More Optimized Interaction or Joint Optimization of Components(2)
– Architectures that are Inherently Insensitive to Adverse Component Interactions (3)
• Ignition Control(7)
– Laser Ignition
– Spark Ignition
– Direct or Indirect Control of Start of Combustion(2)
– Direct or Indirect Control of Middle of Combustion
– Direct or Indirect Control of End of Combustion
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• Fuel Control(6)
– Variable Valve Actuation and Timing
– Piezo-electric Valves
– Multiple/Tailored Injection Pulses(3)
• Control Algorithms (5)
– Better Signal Processing, Diagnostics and Prognostics(3)
– Better Controllers that need little or no adjustment during engine life
– Better Controllers that are tuned for specific engine conditions
• Air Control
– Variable Valve Actuation and Timing
– (Variable Geometry) Turbo Charger/Super Charger
– Exhaust Gas Recirculation
• Electronics Hardware
– Higher Temperature Ratings
– More Compact Designs
– Faster Computations e.g. Faster CPU’s or FPGA’s
– Modular Hardware Design
• Exhaust Control
– Better Catalysts
– Better Filters/Traps
– Better control of Pressure, Temperature and Gas Composition into the Exhaust
Manifold
– Better Exhaust Sensors
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3.3.4 Conflict with other Technologies or Components
Here is a list of potential conflicts with the ICPS as can be deduced from the patent and other
published literature. Note that a conflict need not necessarily be decided in favor of the ICPS.
In order to prevail, ICPS has to replace components that are more mature and typically at a
very low cost stage of their life cycle. So ICPS can either displace the following items, or can
be displaced by incremental improvements in them.
• MAF, MAP, MAT, A/F ratio, Ion: Mass Airflow, Manifold Pressure, Manifold Tempera-
ture, Air/Fuel Ratio and Ion Sensors: The primary purpose for these sensors is to estimate
the conditions in the cylinder and the parameters of the resulting combustion process.
Since the majority of the combustion variables can be deduced from the In-Cylinder
Pressure Trace, then it may render one or more of these sensors obsolete.
• Knock Vibration Sensor: These sensors can pick high frequency vibration resulting from
engine knock (or detonation). However, the knock information is also contained in the
ICPS trace from a high bandwidth sensor.
• Misfire Detection via the Crank Angle: here the rotation of the crank or cam shaft via a
Magnetic Pickup Unit (MPU) is used to detect torsionals that result due to the the effect
of cylinder misfire on engine torque. However, this information is also contained in the
ICPS trace.
• Model-Based Techniques: Observer or Model-Based techniques(e.g. Kalman Filters or
Neural Networks) aim to reconstruct the pressure trace inside the cylinder by sensing
the rotation of the crank or cam shaft plus other signals typically available such as
MAF,MAP,MAT and A/F ratio sensors. The advantage is that one can use cheap signals
to reconstruct expensive information at the expense of on-board computing resources.
On the other hand, Model Based techniques are not discriminatory and in fact work best
when combined with at least one excellent sensor, so that they can help or hurt the ICPS
emergence.
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• Expensive Exhaust After-Treatment Systems: Since ICPS enables lower emission levels at
the source of combustion, then the expectation is that cheaper filters with simpler designs
will be sufficient to meet the near term emission requirements. Hence the expensive
exhaust systems may become displaced or delayed in the near term. However, there
is no long term conflict as no matter how low the emission levels are at the source of
combustion, the regulations will still push to lower levels.
The above list was not included in the survey so there is no rating information. But Knock
Detection and Misfire Detection were highly rated benefits of the the ICPS as reported in section
3.3.3 earlier. The respondents were asked what can disrupt their prediction on the emergence
of ICPS. Five people entered the following:
• Reasons:The sensor proved to be unreliable
• Reasons:There is not a whole lot to optimize in combustion with ICPS on a properly
operating gas engine, other than spark knock avoidance, Better cyl. balancing and engine
noise isn’t worth the cost. ICPS doesn’t help at all for air or fuel control in gasoline, and
isn’t that useful for diesel either.
• Reasons:Additional technologies not considered—Lack of understanding of the problem
• Reasons:Potential degradation of drivability and available power
• Reasons:It won’t.
System Hurdles on the Path of Engine Developers
What are the biggest Engineering System Hurdles to develop engines that meet the efficiency
and emissions requirements?
• control architectures that are robust with good enough performance and cost (6)
• Integration of Different Combustion Modes into One System (5)
• Transitioning from a Component Supplier into an Integrated System Supplier (4)
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• Accurate reliability prediction for the whole engine life cycle
• Managing the ripple effects of incremental changes in complex systems
• accurate system validation process
• High fidelity calibration process
• Identifying complex system risks and using them to steer projects and programs
• Managing concurrent development and innovation
• Awareness and Prediction of Impact of Emerging Technologies
• Managing the Trade-Offs between market, business and product architecture
• How to integrate different development time scales between software, mechanical and
electronic hardware
• Understanding Environmental Variations
• High Fidelity Calibration Process
• How to apply system techniques to deliver software on time and budget
• Accurate System Validation Process.
3.4 Conclusions on the System Impact and Evolution of the
ICPS
The ever increasing pressure on efficiency, emissions, fuel flexibility and the lack of maturity
of viable alternatives to the internal combustion engines in the near future, has caused the
following clearly identifiable trend:
Trend: Engine Developers are incrementally adding complexity and optimizing com-
ponents, such as variable geometry turbochargers, exhaust gas recirculation,
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variable valve actuation etc. The unintended consequence is lack of robustness
or brittleness that emerges at the system level
This chapter described the technical problem that the combustion process in each cylinder,
the source of emissions, efficiency and performance, is very nonlinearly sensitive to the associated
variations. ICPS enables closing the loop around the combustion process to improve the trade-
off of complexity versus robustness for the engine system as a whole, thereby helping the
engine developers maintain bottom line robustness as they add complexity to meet the tighter
requirements. But to be part of the solution and not the problem, the ICPS component itself
has to have an excellent robust performance at a reasonable cost and size. This chapter tracked
the robust design evolution of the ICPS to unravel the architectural approaches of various
suppliers to meeting this objective for production engines. The information shows that several
suppliers such as Bosch, Beru, Denso, NGK, Siemens and OPTRAND already claim to have
solved this problem. The solution is typically in a form that is integrated with another In-
Cylinder component such as the Glowplug, Sparkplug, Injector Valve, Cylinder Head etc. Beru
already lists the full technical specification of their Piezo-resistive ICPS in their product catalog
and may be the sensor that Audi chose for their 2009 Q7 model.
Since the Audi, Cadillac and Honda have not yet released the system architectural details
of their designs using the ICPS, this chapter analyzed the literature and interviewed experts
to make a detailed list of the architectural impact of the ICPS. The list was then incorporated
into an Internet-based survey and sent out to other professionals for rating. Only 21 people
completed the survey so it was not possible to perform cluster analysis to extract reliable
categories of thought on the system impact of the ICPS. So while the original list is reliable,
the ranking that was extracted is not. The following distilled bottom line information on
the system impact of the ICPS is therefore ”likely to be true” but the real truth will reside
somewhere in the much larger space that was detailed in section 3.3:
Key Benefits of Robust Closed Loop Control of Combustion using ICPS:
• Better Cylinder-to-Cylinder Balancing
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• Reducing Cycle-to-Cycle Variation in Combustion per Cylinder
• Reducing Emissions
Application Domain:
• Multi-mode combustion Diesel+HCCI and Gasoline+HCCI engines will
benefit most. The core competencies required will be System Integration
and Innovative Technology.
ICPS has Strong Synergy with:
• System Integration: Architectures that are Inherently Insensitive to Ad-
verse Component Interactions
• Ignition Control: Direct or Indirect Control of Start of Combustion
• Fuel Control: Multiple/Tailored Injection Pulses
ICPS has Possible Conflicts with5:
• Other Sensors: MAF, MAP, MAT, Air/Fuel, Ion, Knock and Misfire Sensor
based on crank angle.
• Expensive Exhaust After-treatment Systems
• Model Based Techniques: Reconstruction of the Pressure Signal from a
combination of cheaper sensors by techniques such as Kalman Filters or
Neural Nets
Top 3 System Hurdles in Meeting Emissions and Efficiency Requirements:
• Control architectures that are robust with good enough performance and
cost.
• Integration of Different Combustion Modes into One System.
5conflicts means that the ICPS can either displace or be displaced by incremental development of one or more
conflicting items
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• Transitioning from a Component Supplier into an Integrated System Sup-
plier.
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Chapter 4
Spillover into the Power Generation
Market
”Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy
is the noise before defeat.”.
–Sun Tzu
It is easy to confirm that spillovers happen between related technologies. Almost any energy
system that is used for transportation has a related land based technology with significant
probabilities of spillover in either direction. For example Gritsevskyi et. al. [63] modeled the
dynamics of spillover between industrial (and residential) and transportation Fuel Cells.
Similarly the new GE LMS100 stationary gas turbine is based on re-using an aero-derivative
gas generator core with an industrial low pressure spool that includes the fan and the power
turbine. Using gas turbines for electricity generation on land or Marine propulsion is itself a
spillover from the aeronautical industry. The land or aircraft versions may look quite dissimilar
in some aspects and certainly have different requirements, but the technologies utilized are
sufficiently similar that improvements in one can spill over into another. Internal Combustion
engines are no exception in this regard. Diesel Common Rail injection first spilled over into the
automobile segment from the larger heavy duty trucks and then spilled over again into the large
diesel electrical generators. Electronic fuel injection systems is another example application
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that spilled over from the automotive to the power generation industry. There are many other
examples. This chapter first focuses on the issues of adoption of the ICPS technology in the
automotive industry followed by analysis of information in the preceding chapters to find the
triggers that can cause the spillover of the ICPS into the power generation industry. The
reason for focusing on the ICPS technology spillover is that it is as example of a technology
that enables Architectural Innovation, which is a key capability required for suppliers to move1
up the system integration hierarchy to capture more value.
Like other markets for mature complex engineering systems, the Power Generation market
is slow and so is the pace of associated technology. The typical mode of progress is through
planned incremental architectural or component improvements. This is reflected in relatively
rigid processes or tacit knowledge embedded in information flow patterns and infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the stepwise cyclic implementation of new emission regulations is becoming increas-
ingly harder to comply with, because they kick in at a faster rate than the natural time constant
of engine development of typically 5 to 10 years. Given this context, the main focus of this
chapter is on how component suppliers may take advantage of this disturbance to move up the
food chain to become integrated system solution providers.
This chapter refers to a body of knowledge known as Technology Strategy. The main
purpose of this field is not to make better forecasts of future states or strategies that succeed
based on the best possible or most favorable future unfolding of events. The purpose is to
improve the odds of success no matter how the future unfolds. Raynor’s [20] recent book on
”Strategy Paradox” is precisely focused on this issue of how to make the overall strategy robust
by employing for example ”real options”.
1This move is a milder form of a more general case, in which architectural innovation enables ”insurgents” to
establish a leadership position in the new architecture at the expense of ”incumbents”.
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4.1 Adoption of the ICPS Technology in the Automotive Mar-
ket
Section 1.2.2 pointed to very detailed announcements by Honda, Audi and Cadillac, about their
late 2008 and 2009 production engines that will be fitted with ICPS. Chapter 3 referenced a
large number of ICPS patents by a number of very credible and established suppliers, OEM’s
and consulting outfits. Yet, this strong evidence of emergence does not guarantee a successful
market penetration. For example, Toyota started experimenting with the ICPS technology
20 years ago and even introduced it into one of their models[44] in 1994. Similarly SAAB
started with Ion Sensing about the same time. Both cases did not yield a successful adoption
or significant market penetration.
Geoffrey Moore’s model of technology adoption explains the phenomena why many tech-
nologies or products fail to ”cross the chasm”. His bell curve model in figure 4-1 shows cracks
between each phase of adoption and a particularly large chasm between the Early Adopters
and Early Majority that he identifies as the most significant hurdle for adoption. The Early
adopters are those who expect to ”get a jump on the competition...from lower costs, fast time to
market, more complete customer service or some other comparable business advantage...Being
the first, they also are prepared to bear with the inevitable bugs and glitches that accompany
any innovation just coming to the market”.
The early adopters are specialist technology enthusiasts with product-centric values such as
Speed, Ease of Use, Elegant Architecture, Price and Unique functionality. The early majority,
on the other side of the chasm are pragmatists with market centric values such as Largest
Installed Base, Most Third-Party Supporters, De facto Standard, Cost of Ownership, and
Quality of Support. The problem with crossing the chasm is that the technology first develops
the product centric attributes that are nothing like or not easily transferable to the market
centric attributes needed for convincing the skeptic pragmatists. In the world of integrated
system solutions, there is the additional difficulty that the pragmatists are looking for the
practical ”system level” market centric benefits that emerges from interaction of cheap and
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Figure 4-1: Technology Adoption Life Cycle and Competitive Positiotning Compass of Geoffrey
Moore [13].
reliable components and cannot easily get excited about ”special” attributes of components.
An element of Moore’s solution to this problem is to define or create a competition, so that
by comparison, the new technology looks great. In the world of mature engineering systems
however, often one does not have this luxury. A very well defined, and trusted competition
typically already exists in the form of a division or unit at the OEM, who is also the customer,
would also be typically responsible for delivering integrated system solutions and evaluating
competition. For example, the engine OEM’s typically hold on to integrative technologies such
as the Controls and Embedded Software divisions. The threshold for accepting alternative
solutions from outside the company walls is therefore typically very high.
In Moore’s model the visionary early adopters are willing to live with trading off reliability
for some performance or other benefit, chief among which is generating revenue while improving
the pragmatic aspects of the system. Only the pragmatists across the chasm care first and
foremost about practical issues like reliability. This cannot be further from the truth in mature
complex engineering systems that are also safety critical. All parties, including visionaries,
absolutely do not have the luxury of a slack in robustness and reliability. For example Audi
will never put the ICPS on their 2009 Q7 models to gain an efficiency or emission advantage
just at full load at the expense of more frequent misfires or knocks or a cold starting problem
etc. A new technology is initially allowed to be problematic in other areas but never allowed
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to be less robust or less reliable than the preceding products. Boeing aircraft does not have
the option of temporarily fatally loosing a larger percentage of passengers in order to generate
funds while improving the reliability of their next generation aircraft. Toyota’s Prius scored
very high on reliability at first introduction. In this domain, everyone is an extreme pragmatist
when it comes to robustness and reliability. This is the fundamental difficulty with complex
mature safety critical systems: i.e the OEM’s take a big risk to pour huge resources to develop
a new technology to sufficient maturity, before being able to capture the extra value inherent in
the new technology. This is at least one reason why incremental innovation is the main mode
of improvement, i.e because the outcome is more predictable. Rebecca Henderson [14] gives
other structural reasons discussed later in section 4.4.
To be fair to Moore’s model, it is possible for technology to develop in none safety critical
applications, i.e. in very different markets. But again the probability of a spillover into the
safety critical complex engineering system domain will be low because robustness is an inherent
emergent property of the architecture and if a new technology is not robust, it is unlikely that
minor tweaking or development will improve the chances of spillover into the safety critical
domain. The more complex the system that is supposed to integrate this new technology, the
more difficult the spillover. Technologies that have spilled over, such as electronic fuel injection,
exhibited cost effective robust performance in their home market before the spillover occurred.
So ICPS technology will likely have to demonstrate robust cost effective performance in the
automotive industry before it can spill over into the mainstream power generation market.
Now how will the ICPS technology be dynamically adopted in the automotive industry?
Struben [2] used a very elaborate system dynamic model to capture the dynamics adoption
of Alternative Fuel Vehicles (AFV’s) in the automotive industry. Fortunately, the model that
he developed has a very generic structure for technology adoption in that industry. The left
side of figure 4-2 gives a top level view of his model that includes the dynamics within and
between consumer, industry, suppliers (3rd parties) and external factors such as Fuel Costs
or environmental factors. The model for example shows how Consumer Choice drives sales
that drives R&D that improves the Attractiveness (Price, Performance etc.) that Drives the
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Consumer Choice, forming a reinforcing closed loop. Another interesting loop is how Consumer
Choice drives Sales that drives Fleet Size that drives Familiarity through networking and word
of mouth effects that reinforces Consumer Choice and so on. The special thing about System
Dynamics is not that these effects or loops are not known individually elsewhere. But when you
have a complex interaction of many loops with nonlinear or high order effects, System Dynamics
helps us see the overall outcome and sort out the short term versus long term dynamic effects
and helps us determine the conditions where different loops dominate the response. Using this
structure, he produced a collection of possible adoption curves as shown in figure 4-2. Note
that there appears to be two points of equilibrium. Once the market share rises above some
critical value of 20%, there is enough momentum to eventually tend toward a maximum market
capture. Below this critical value, all the curves tend toward a low market capture equilibrium
or failure. This critical value, is then analogous to the far side of the ”chasm” in Moore’s model
that adoption has to reach, before the dominant dynamics such as sustained price reduction,
support and technical maturity ensure a sustained penetration in the market.
By analogy, we can expect that the ICPS technology will either reach the minimum required
threshold that will lead to eventual full adoption or it will return to a low adoption level
equilibrium that is not sufficient to cause a spillover. In other words, penetration has to reach
a relatively high level before one can be certain of a full adoption. A system dynamic model,
similar to Struben’s[2] but tailored to the problem of ICPS spillover into the Power Generation
market can be developed to define early warning signals of full adoption in order to gain some
predictive time advantage relative to other players. However this is outside the scope of this
thesis.
4.2 Triggers for Spillover
The automotive industry is an excellent source of cost effective reliable technology for spillover,
because it is a very large and efficient business ecosystem that generates a lot of value. For
example, it is amazing that a mid to high end automobile engine, costs less than a mid to high
end bicycle!
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Figure 4-2: System Dynamic Model of Technology Adoption (left) and predicted responses
(right) (Copied from Struben [2]).
To illustrate the point, suppose it costs 10 years2 and 10 people, at a rate of US$ 100,000 to
develop a new ICPS sensor and to upgrade the control system to more accurately and robustly
control the combustion in a large e.g. 6MW industrial engine used to generate electricity. Let’s
assume this development cost is to be recovered over the first 5000 engines sold. Then, the
price of each unit would have to be increased by at least US$ 2000. However, in the automotive
industry, the sales volumes are around two orders of magnitude larger so the same development
effort would only increase the cost of each car by around US 20. This is not even a full tank
of gasoline!. So, the automotive business ecosystem is an excellent bearer of development costs
and reducing unit price while satisfying stringent robustness and reliability requirements. Due
to the technical similarity with industrial engines, it is possible that the improvements in the
automotive sector will satisfy or surpass some power generation requirements. Hence it is useful
to compare some key high level differences of the power generation relative to the automotive
industry:
Emphasis on Time-to-Market : is higher in Power Generation. The rate of introduction of
new car models every year may give the incorrect appearance that time to market is more critical
in the automotive industry. However, the actual rate of introduction of new automotive engine
platforms is much slower because a platform is utilized across many model years. In addition,
25 years to develop the sensor and 5 years to upgrade the engine, not necessarily in series.
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automotive OEM’s can afford to employ large parallel development teams and spend relatively
larger sums due to high volume and high value nature of the business ecosystem discussed earlier.
In the power generation industry, the volumes are orders of magnitude smaller, resources that
can be brought to meet a new emission deadline is relatively more limited and the large scale
heavy duty infrastructure to design, build and test makes resistance to engine architectural
innovations higher. Here only incremental or local ”drop in” solutions are relatively easy to
deal with.
Emphasis on Conversion Efficiency : is higher in Power Generation . A 1 % average con-
version efficiency improvement for a car from say 30 mpg to 30.3 mpg is not very exciting.
But the same 1 percent efficiency improvement for a 40% efficiency 6 MW generator that runs
continuously for a year is a saving of more than US$140000 per year assuming US$0.03/MJ for
price of fuel. Recall from chapter 3 that one benefit of the ICPS was a gain in efficiency, but
this was not the main driver in the automotive market.
Emphasis on Misfire and Knock Detection: is higher in Power Generation because a number
of factors join to make alternative methods of detection more difficult and less successful here.
For example detecting misfires in a 16 cylinder smoother running power generation engine via
observing torsionals at the crank shaft are harder than a 6 cylinder automotive engine because
missing 1 out of 16 firings in one combustion cycle has less effect on the crankshaft speed than
missing 1 out of 6 firings. Being coupled to a stiff electrical grid and higher inertias make
misfire detection even more difficult in Power Generation. Partial or intermittent misfires are
also harder in larger engines. Knock detection has higher emphasis in power generation because
there is a performance versus emissions trade-off advantage by operating closer to the knock
boundary in individual cylinders, and engine efficiency has higher emphasis as explained earlier.
Emphasis on Multi-fuel Capability : is higher in Power Generation. This is similar to the
emphasis on efficiency argument above. If prices for bulk purchases of fuel (E.g. Natural Gas,
Bio-fuels or Diesel) fluctuate and differ even by small margins, then optimizing the purchasing
policy of different fuels leads to large fuel cost savings, possibly more than the already significant
1 % efficiency gain explained above.
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Emphasis on Robustness and Reliability : is similar in Power Generation. Recall the detailed
discussion and definitions of Robustness given in chapter 2 that Robustness is mainly concerned
with sensitivity and is a subset of Reliability that also includes a large number of other concerns.
The large power generation engines typically have large number of cylinders say 16 versus 6
or 8 cylinder maximum for mass production automotive engines. The more frequent firings
per combustion cycle and the higher inertias ensure a relatively smoother combined torque
output and smaller torsional modes at the crank shaft. These engines are also relatively more
massive and less transient 3 since for example the typical running mode will be at synchronized
speed coupled to the electrical grid. Power generation engines are also stationary and not
subjected to g-forces. The Cylinder volumes are also much larger and knock frequencies are
lower. Combination of all these factors means that the bandwidth and vibration or g-force
pickup problem of the indirect sensing ICPS designs explained in chapter 3 are smaller concerns
for power generation. Sensitivity to pressure and temperature ranges are similar between the
two industries. The main reliability concern with power generation is that the engine must run
continuously for very long duration without a malfunction while maintaining acceptable levels
of efficiency and emissions. The reliability requirement for ICPS was stated in section 3.1 as
the range 0.2 to 5 billion cycles where the power generation requirement is close the the upper
bound. So smoother stationary power generation application places less emphasis on robustness
but the tougher utilization places more emphasis on reliability so that the components are
typically ”beefier” or more massive.
Emphasis on Emissions: is similar in Power Generation. The timing of the emission reg-
ulations or their cyclic nature may be different between the two markets but the stress that
is felt by the OEM’s to comply is already at maximum levels. In other words, it is a struggle
to keep up with the stepwise emission regulatory push in both industries. Another way to see
this is that the regulations push to minimize emissions toward zero in both industries and the
targets chosen are always a challenge to meet.
3 Full load reject for large power generation engines is a possible exception where the transient requirements
are tougher relative to the automotive industry. For example, the injectors may experience too much pressure
differential during a full load reject and possibly cause misfires.
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Emphasis on Smoothness: Cycle-to-Cycle and Cylinder-to-Cylinder Balancing: is same (i.e.
equally high) in power generation. In the automotive industry, smoothness translates to end
customer satisfaction. In the Power Generation industry, too much cycle-to-cycle variation
limits how closely the engine can run near the knock limit and thereby limits the efficiency.
Cylinder-to-Cylinder and Cycle-to-Cycle variations also increase the vibration and noise levels
as well as decrease engine life. Section 3.3.2 described how the ICPS can be used to reduce
these variations and this ability of the ICPS was ranked the highest in the Internet-based survey
reported in section 3.3.3.
Emphasis on Unit Cost of ICPS : is lower in Power Generation because of the fuel cost offset
explained above and because the additional unit cost is a much smaller percentage of the total
system cost. Note that the price of the automotive ICPS sensor itself was earlier estimated
to be around US$10 to US$20 today, and that the automotive industry will probably push it
toward the ideal US$5 as the ICPS significantly penetrates the market. Now since the volumes
in the Power generation industry are much lower than in the automotive industry, one would
expect to pay much more than US$5, but the multiplier is smaller than the effect of system
and fuel cost offset. Hence the unit cost improvement of the automotive ICPS that results
from large scale adoption is likely to make their cost an easy requirement to satisfy for power
generation.
Emphasis on Multi-Mode Combustion: is lower in Power Generation. The main driver for
fast transition between HCCI and SI mode (or PCCI and Diesel mode) is the fact that auto-
motive engines are often running at part load. Power Generation engines are mostly operating
near full load where they are efficient. However, there is a synergy between Multi-fuel and
Muti-mode capability so this emphasis may change in the future for power generation. For
example, one reason that the HCCI is limited to part load operation is that it takes time to
premix the charge and the available time for mixing is less at higher engine speeds. However,
the large power generation engines are running at much lower speeds and there is more spatial
opportunity to premix the charge.
The above relative emphasis information was summarized in table 4.1. The table also
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Requirement Relative Emphasis Trigger for Spillover
Time to Market High High
Efficiency High High
Misfire and Knock Detection High High
Multi-fuel Capability High High
Robustness and Reliability Same High
Emissions Same Medium
Smoothness Same Medium
Unit Cost Low High
Multi-mode Combustion Low Low
Table 4.1: Emphasis on various Requirements in the Power Generation relative to the Auto-
motive Industry, and the associated probability of Triggering or Catalyzing a Spillover.
includes a column that shows the probability that each item will work as a trigger (or catalyst)
for the spillover into the Power Generation industry. This was obtained by further processing the
ICPS System Impact information of section 3.3.3. For example the table shows that Reliability
is similarly emphasized between the two industries and that satisfying this requirement has a
high probability of triggering the spillover. The reason is that if adoption crosses the ”chasm”
in the automotive sector, there is every reason to believe that reliability will be driven to ideal
levels with time. Since this item is similarly emphasized and a key requirement in the Power
Generation industry, then there is a high probability that this item can help trigger the spillover.
In other areas, such as Misfire and Knock Detection, the relative emphasis is high but its
spillover trigger probability is also high because the technical difficulty of detecting Misfire or
Knock from the Cylinder pressure trace is not harder in Power Generation.
The way to interpret the information in table 4.1 is that a number of high probability high
emphasis triggers are necessary for spillover and just one trigger may not be sufficient. As
mentioned earlier, Electronic Fuel Injection and Common Rail did manage to spillover from
the automotive industry into power generation. However, some other technologies have not yet
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survived the ”scale up” such as Exhaust Gas Recirculation4 and Piezoelectric Fuel Valves that
work well in automotive applications. Nevertheless, once the automotive ecosystem has driven
up the reliability, performance and cost-effectiveness, the only hurdles in the path of an ICPS
spillover is to develop a rugged (somewhat more expensive) version together with the ability
to absorb architectural innovation. The former is relatively routine, but the latter is a typical
vulnerability of mature complex engineering system developers as will be discussed later in
section 4.4.
4.3 The Status Quo in the Value Chain
A mature engineering system integrator business model typically relies on:
1. Generating Value: that results from the integration of a large number of cheap but reliable
high quality components, a significant proportion of which comes from external suppliers.
2. Capturing Value: by supplying high level integrated solutions that solve challenging prob-
lems in a way that none5 can duplicate. Breadth of scope (i.e. the number of components
on an engine) is of secondary priority as compared to the differentiation that comes from
(almost)unique6 solutions in the market place.
The total supply chain is made up of connected links where this integrator model recursively
holds. In other words, there are multiple tiers of suppliers where the top tier players provide
higher levels of integrated system solutions.
4Carter [64] says that ”EGR was studied and rejected by CAT and Cummins for their current off-highway
strategy, although cooled EGR remains an option for eventual Tier IV compliance”.
5Those who intend to move up the integration hierarchy would need to emphasize uniqueness more than a
stable top tier system solution supplier who can coexist or compete with one or two other suppliers.
6For example, a control algorithm that improves the coordination of multiple lower quality actuators to
improve the system level robust performance, will always trump the solution that replaces all actuators with
the same number of more advanced actuators. The former solution is much harder to accomplish and more
differentiating in the market than the latter. Even if the advanced actuators are marvelous, they will be perceived
as overkill by comparison with the rest that appear to be doing more or less the same thing at a lower price tag.
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In this chapter we need to be aware of not applying models that were developed by observing
the high tech industry. Some high technology firms such as Microsoft, Sun/IBM, or Nokia tend
to dominate the Platform around which a large number of third parties prosper. Cusumano [65]
describes the evolution of the software business ecosystem into platform leaders and platform
complementers. He shows that the success of Microsoft is much more attributable to their
platform strategy than luck. Evans et. al. [23] give a range of other examples where Multi-
sided platforms have transformed industries such as Google, Apple, TiVO etcetera. Note that
the concept of platform in the business sense is quite different to what is commonly referred to
as a platform in engineering circles7.
Unfortunately the domain of safety critical mature complex engineering systems (Aircraft,
Automobiles, Power Generation etc.) is very different in nature to the very exciting High Tech
industry (Microsoft, Sony, Google, Nokia, Blackberry etc.) that has dazzled most of the scholars
that straddle the cross section of technology and business. Here the pace of technology and
market is very slow by comparison. The Disruptive Technology framework of Christensen [21]
is an example of a very insightful framework but one that can be very dangerous or at least
counterproductive to apply in our domain, where the effect of emergence of new technologies is
much more subtle. Major technological disruptions are very rare here and advances typically
help, not hurt the high level leading system integrators. For example, a very high performance
high technology spark plug will just ”drop in” or replace an existing component to benefit
several OEM’s without disturbing the status quo or putting any OEM out of business! Radical
or high technology solutions are either simply not robust enough to work in this tough heavy
duty domain, or when robust solutions do appear, it is solely owned or co-owned by the OEM’s
who continue to maintain their leading position. The gasoline-electric hybrid power plant is an
example. It helped the owner Toyota both in profits and the green market buzz, but there are
now many other OEM’s that benefit by either licensing Toyota technology or developing their
7In a business platform, you have to figure how value (e.g. US$) flows and how a large number of players
prosper around an ecosystem and how to ensure a dominant platform leader or complementer role. So leaders
or dominant players are concerned about the health and prosperity of the whole ecosystem. In engineering, a
platform is a way of solving the major issues once and reusing it cost effectively to generate many derivatives.
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own alternative solutions. The next generation alternative Fuel Cell vehicle is also not likely to
disrupt major OEM’s since the OEM’s will be the most likely source of this technology. This
however does not mean that emerging technologies have no effect, only that their effects do not
resemble disruptive technologies. For example Carter [64] reports that Caterpillar spent US$500
million on its ACERT technology that it expects will make their engines emission compliant for
the next 10 to 20 years. So the OEM’s are having to spend huge amounts and there is no solid
guarantee that the technologies they invest in will definitely deliver robust compliant solutions.
Making expensive mistakes is a different effect than not surviving a technology disruption.
Another inapplicable framework is the ”Predator/Prey” framework of James Moore [13].
The reality in the heavy mature industry is very different to ”cut throat” competition. For
example, Airbus and Boeing, two competing lions in Moore’s analogy, are happily using a long
list of similar top tier system suppliers without getting into battle. There is typically at least two
engine choices for Airbus aircraft from a list that includes GE, Pratt & Whitney, Rolls Royce
etc. The next generation of nuclear power plants from competing firms GE and Westinghouse
will likely use the same supplier from Japan for a critical part. Several automotive OEM’s use
Bosch fuel system components. Even business acquisitions in the heavy industry are typically
”friendly” and not necessarily hostile. So the reality on the ground is more like ”coopetition”
than competing lions, or Prey that suddenly decide to become Predators etc. It is true that one
can gain insights by comparing business to a biological ecosystem. But it becomes dangerous
if the model predicts an improbable reality followed by recommendations for executives!.
Note that the ”Predator/Prey”[13] and ”Disruptive Technology” [21] frameworks are of
general applicability and may hold true when considering the total evolution of technologies.
For example, Slagle[15] points out that the gas turbine was a radical innovation that disrupted
the reciprocating piston engine technology for aeronautical applications and gives data on how
its performance and power to weight ratio advantages initially outweigh its immature reliability
in the beginning. However, at this mature point in the evolution of complex safety critical
power generation systems, the ”Predator/Prey” and ”Disruptive Technology” frameworks are
not particularly relevant, and using them to find solutions for moving up the system integration
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hierarchy would be inappropriate. So the simple 2 point system integrator business model stated
earlier is not bad in the absence of a framework that is actually based on massive observation
of system integrators in the heavy industries:
Value Generation. The value generation part works by continuously pushing on the suppli-
ers to standardize their components and improve their quality and price. Competition between
suppliers ensures a high degree of compliance. An automotive engine component sale profes-
sional told the author that under continuous pressure from their OEM customer, they end up
reducing the price of a US$12 component to just US$2 in 5 to 10 years. The suppliers that
survive under this pressure are those that can compete on basis of cost or those that continue to
add new desirable components to their offering. For the best suppliers in the automotive high
volume market, this is not necessarily a bad thing because as a new component penetrate the
market, the higher volumes offset the unit price decrease. Unfortunately, this low cost supplier
model becomes less sustainable in the low volume power generation market.
Value Capture. The value capture part works by maximizing the cost effective robust
performance property that emerges by integrating components. In this heavy duty mature
industry, delivering sensitive systems is not an option but a relative robustness advantage for a
given required performance is quickly discovered. Charging more than the competition8 is also
not an easy option because the customer usually understands their bottom line well and their
cost targets are not very flexible.
The ”status quo” is that integrated solution providers tend to keep their position along
the supply chain with time and harvest greater portion of the value generated in the supply
chain. The component suppliers on the other hand tend to feel squeezed with time because it is
difficult to keep cutting costs or maintain a regular predictable innovative output in the form of
new components when not capturing much of the value generated in the supply chain. Moving
up the ladder for a component supplier would normally mean that the high level integrator who
is also the customer, would be willing to give up a piece of its high value capture activity.
8in some Financial/Banking circles, a lower price may have a negative perception about system quality.
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For suppliers deeper in the supply chain, it is usually true that moving up the chain by
delivering higher integration levels will be more profitable and sustainable9. But at higher
integration levels, this is not always clear. For example, will Caterpillar capture more value if
they move up the chain to become an electric production utility? or will GE Aircraft Engines
capture more value if they had the capability to manufacture aircraft? Carter [64] mentions
that Cummins has already decided to move up a level:
”In fact, Cummins prefers to be known as more than just an engine builder:
”We want to be the company that can supply not just the engine, but everything
around the diesel as well,” says Mark Levett, vice president and general manager of
Cummins HHP, referring to Cummins subsidiaries such as Holsett (turbochargers),
Fieetguard (filtration), and others. ”Robust engine design and a strong distribution
system are required for success in high load factor, high service hour applications
such as mining, but customers want their engine builders to provide the total pack-
age.””
Unfortunately, there are many hurdles in the path of moving up the system integration
ladder. A side effect of the mature slow industry is that component oriented culture, processes
and infrastructure are deeply ingrained in their organization. For example, they may suffer from
the tendency of solving the system integration problem by doing what they do best: designing
better or more sophisticated components and not attempting to maximize the robust emergent
properties at the higher integration level. Nevertheless there are examples of companies that
managed to get promoted to the next level and companies that were demoted to the lower level
and the key question is how they did it.
The author found no reliable in depth scholarly focus on the topic of moving up the system
integration value chain in any of the complex engineering system industries such as aerospace
or power generation. Yet there are a few technology strategy publications that help answer
9This holds true for systems where integration is difficult, such as power generation systems. In a different
PC world today, many OEM’s are adding little value at the system level, because integration is relatively easy,
and the value flows to vendors of common components (such as Intel or Microsoft).
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some basic questions in the absence of hard evidence. These are utilized in the next section
to give some strategic recommendations for moving up, in the context of combustion control
systems and the emergence of ICPS.
The main take away from this section is that the position of top system integrators in the
mature complex engineering system industry is inherently stable and not easily influenced by
the emergence of new technologies, or the cyclic implementation of new emission regulations.
Furthermore, moving up the the system integration ladder in this domain presents special
challenges that have not yet been studied by scholars in depth.
4.4 Strategic Recommendations for Moving up the System In-
tegration Ladder
Technology Strategy is a way of structurally improving the odds of success by extracting useful
high level information or patterns by integrating existing or past information. The useful
references are not about formulating a special forecast or a plan that only works when this
forecast becomes true. For example, our strategy should not be based on the assumption that
housing or oil prices will continue to rise, although this may appear to be very likely when we
are formulating the strategy. It should also work when these prices fall, oscillate or remain
steady. So just like complex engineering systems, the business strategy has to be robust, and
robustness is first and foremost determined architecturally. Again, tweaking the parameters of
a fixed architecture has only secondary effect. We can increase the percentage of R&D funds
or allocate more resources to move up the system integration ladder, but if that is all we do,
the gains will quickly reach the inherent limit that is set by the organizational architecture.
If a company’s revenue has a long history of primarily coming from supplying components to
mature industries like aerospace, automotive, or power generation, then there is no reason to
believe that its existing organizational architecture or its successful people are already perfectly
aligned for moving up the integrated system value chain to capture more value.
Unfortunately, the majority of reputable technology strategy references is focused on the
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faster dynamic effects of the high tech industry or trying to formulate a unified theory to solve
the problem for everybody. One reference captures part of the problem with mature complex
engineering system suppliers, where the business dynamics are slow. Rebecca Henderson [14]
describes the context of the problem as follows:
”...no one individual can be an expert in multiple technologies, markets, and pro-
cesses required to design an object of of any sophistication...Architectural knowl-
edge is both knowledge about the linkages between components, and knowledge
about the impact design decisions made in one component are likely to have
on another... After an initial phase of rapid exploration and diversity, most
technologies evolve towards a ”dominant design”... Once a dominant design
is in place, the development of new component knowledge becomes a constant
focus...Since in this regime, the relationship among components do not change,
architectural knowledge tends to become embedded in the tacit knowledge of the
organization, a part of the organizational furniture... As long as the technological
and commercial environment of a design group remain stable, the embeddedness
of architectural knowledge can be an enormous source of strength.
This is a key insight. For example, by stealing the top engineers or managers away from
a mature system integrator OEM, a component supplier will not necessarily move any closer
toward becoming a system integrator for that OEM or any other. The key about ”tacit”
knowledge or the essence of what makes an OEM great at what they do is not explicitly
captured in some database or known by a few people. Henderson explains that this essence is
implicitly deeply ingrained through incremental evolution in the communication, organizational,
process, accounting, reward systems and other ”organizational furniture”. An Intel manager
recently told the author that their distributed design centers around the world are almost
”exact copies” (equipment, processes, reporting structure etc.) with a clear intent to minimize
the differences between them. Other than the obvious resource flexibility, part of the reason is
that they have something that works that is not explicitly captured in a few basic rules. It is
all or nothing. There is a famous engineering story about an aircraft engine component called
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a curvic coupling, that the organization was afraid to modify thirty years after it was designed
because the people who understood it were retired or gone. Mechanical engineers today, have
tools that far surpass what was available thirty years ago to improve or replace a mechanical
component. What was missing was that they had no idea how a change here would ripple across
the rest of the complex system. By not touching it and working around this component, they
could minimize the uncertainty.
Henderson[14] correctly points out that as long as there is stability, ”tacit knowledge” is
a competitive advantage and source of strength. However, this strength is also the cause of
vulnerability to ”Architectural Innovation”. Figure 4-3 shows her framework for categorizing
innovation. The modus operandi of mature engineering system developers is in the upper left
quadrant tagged Incremental Innovation where the Core Concepts are reinforced and linkages
between Core Concepts and Components are unchanged. An extreme form of incremental
innovation is a ”drop in” replacement of a component with a more advanced component that
has very little ripple effect on the rest of the system. Architectural innovation is in the lower left
quadrant of the figure. This mode reinforces the core concepts but the linkage is changed. For
example, the emergence of ICPS technology does not change the core concept that the emission
and efficiency performance engine must be robust. This has been the core concept for a very
long time. However, using the ICPS shifts the strong reliance on open loop characterization
and external integral sensors toward feedback control with an individual sensor in each cylinder
that directly measures combustion.
Slagle [15] correctly points out that gas turbines represent a radical innovation compared
to reciprocating engines for aircraft application. But now, after about 80 years of sustained
development and large scale adoption, the typical innovation mode is incremental. Today, the
proportion of characters like Frank Whittle or Hans von Ohain who understood most of the
system issues of their concepts at the time is small, in favor of a large portion of mature engineers
who deeply understand a small piece of a much complexer system working in an organization
that ”tacitly” ensures robustness. Again, the faster rate of appearance of new engine models can
be deceiving. In fact, an engine platform is designed once and many derivatives are generated
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Figure 4-3: Rebecca Henderson’s[14] Framework for architectural categories of innovation.
from it, reusing as much of the common core as possible.
Incremental innovation has a self perpetuating effect causing stability. For example, during
80 years of gas turbine development, the older technical system level experts and their associate
”tacit” knowledge have been disappearing through retirement or other secondary effects. On
two large system level jobs that cannot be detailed here, some key design decisions made by
the engineering team at two different OEM’s was primarily based on the author’s ability to
simulate the dynamic response and robustness analysis of the integrated fuel system, where the
focus was on adverse effects that arise by the interaction of components. This level of reliance
on external expertise was rarer before the knowledge drain started. The interesting issue was
that the system was made of a number of third party components, whose suppliers had zero
knowledge about the dynamic response of their component, let alone how this would interact
with the rest of the system. So long term sustained incremental innovation is burning the stick
as both ends: The OEM’s are slowly loosing their tacit system integration knowledge10, and
many component suppliers do not have a reason to hold on to or develop enough expertise
beyond low cost manufacture of their components to a fixed spec. This is an opportunity for
players who want to mean more to the OEM’s that they do today.
Another factor is that the most prized emergent property of mature safety critical systems
10 A key component of tacit knowledge are the people and their interactions, so just hiring new people by itself
cannot fix the drain, because there is no explicit database for the new people to learn from.
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Figure 4-4: OEM’s are under investing in Conceptual and Preliminary Design. Slagle proposes
a architectural approach for improving the robustness of complex systems upfront. (Figure
copied from Slagle’s thesis [15]).
is robust performance, a property that is above all determined by the system architecture as
explained earlier in chapter 2. Instead the OEM’s are spending the majority of their resources
in the detailed design of complexer or more advanced components, and compliance phases that
only yield small gains. Jason Slagle [15] identifies this gap and recommends focusing on the
conceptual and preliminary design phases, shown in Figure 4-4, where the robustness return
on investment is high. The figure shows that the majority of the the OEM effort is spent in
areas that determines 34% of the life cycle cost where ease of change is relatively low, versus
the upfront phases that determines 66% of life cycle cost, where the ease of change is relatively
high. There are examples in the literature, such as Shahroudi [66] who proposed a modern
approach for multi-disciplinary conceptual/preliminary design process for gas-turbine based
aircraft engines. Hence the problem is not about lack of approaches, the problem is with the
incremental innovation ”lock in” that dominates.
The opportunity provided by the OEM’s lack of focus on up front design phases raises an
interesting question: Can consulting firms (such as IAV or FEV) or others who presumably
have a lot of integrative and in-depth specialist knowledge, break away from the OEM’s and
independently deliver superior engines to capture a slice of the market? The answer is probably
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no, because :
• none OEM’s do not have anything that replaces the OEM ”tacit” knowledge that is
responsible for achieving the required robust performance levels for safety critical systems.
• the resources required for R&D,compliance and testing, dwarf any capacity that none
OEM’s can muster. Carter [64] mentioned a budget of US$500 million and US$200 million
for the Caterpillar ACERT program and Cummins R&D respectively. This order of
magnitude ensures a significant barrier to entry.
• OEM’s own the ”data”. Making a solution in a lab under controlled conditions is a
million miles away from a robust system that in the field can be relied on. No amount
of self congratulation or hype will help if the system is not robust to ”real effects” in the
field. Only the OEM’s own the data that captures these unwanted real effects. This data
was paid for heavily through decades of testing that only radical innovation can render
inapplicable. Slagle [15] tracked the robust design evolution of the jet engine. In 80 years
of development, the main mode of innovation was incremental or rarely architectural,
never radical.
It is very interesting that suppliers typically try to interface very well with the commercial
or operational units at the OEM because after all, these are the people who actually sign the
checks. This is in line with the normal intuition of sales to sell to the economic buyer and
not the enthusiast. Direct communication between the technical experts of suppliers with the
OEM’s, is relatively rare or happens indirectly via the commercial people at the two ends. This
model probably works very well in majority of cases where we are not dealing with mature
complex engineering systems that are also safety critical. Here again, the key card that trumps
everything else is robust performance. So the suppliers can strike an extremely close commercial
relationship with the OEM’s, yet despite all the good will and pressure from their commercial
colleagues, if the engineering organization feels or can show that the supplier proposed solutions
are not robust or not a significant improvement, the deal will eventually break. So the direct
commercial relationship should be balanced with direct technical relationship, particularly with
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the upfront conceptual/preliminary design people at the OEM or their customers. These groups
are typically not the center of attention as they are not absorbing large funds, but are the people
actually charged with improving the architecture of their systems to gain robust performance.
A direct technical relationship with them would in the very least, inform of the hot architectural
issues and possibly some early warning on the form of integrated system solutions that are likely
to be pursued soon or in the near future.
Ultimately strategic recommendations for those who want to move up the system integration
hierarchy is twofold: Value Generation and Value Capture. Recommendations are also very
supplier and situation dependent because for example, some component suppliers may have
had a higher level system integrator role in the past, who may have an easier path than others
who have always been component suppliers. As mentioned earlier, there is a lack of directly
applicable technology strategy references focused primarily on mature complex safety critical
engineering systems. The following recommendations is based on the authors own experience
and analysis of information in the literature referred to in this thesis. Here are my generic
recommendations for value creation for a hypothetical component supplier:
Value Creation:
1. Focus on Architectural Innovation: This is an area where the OEM’s are vulnerable and
one of the few areas for high level work in system integration where the OEM’s need and
would presumably appreciate help.
2. Establish Technical Contact : with the technical professionals responsible for concep-
tual/preliminary design at the OEM’s and their customers.
3. Generate Integrated System Models: As a matter of principle, generate state of the art
control oriented system models for all the different systems that are now being supplied
with components. The OEM’s have relied on their ”tacit” knowledge that is draining
through aging workforce and retirement. Other pure component suppliers have increas-
ingly less idea on how their component behave dynamically. Hence system models that
capture explicit knowledge become increasingly valuable with time.
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4. Generate Engineering Real Options: Generated high level integrated system solutions on
paper, up to and including a working prototype, but not all the investment that goes into
making an actual product. A common mistake is to only work on component projects
requested by the commercial side of OEM or people working at or near the tail in figure 4-
4. Moving up the integration hierarchy requires a fast exercise (i.e. Fast Time to Market)
of this type of option.
5. Invest in Integrative Technologies: The gap between some of the integrative technologies
applied in the OEM’s systems and available technology continues to increase because they
can typically only absorb incremental innovation. For example, the control algorithms
used to control commercial gas turbines today are typically at least 30 to 40 years behind
the more recent robust controls or distributed controls theory. Software as an engineering
system is another area because the cost of software development and V&V is becoming a
very significant development cost. The phobia of losing robustness or the possible ripple
effects are the reason why the OEM’s are not taking the risk. This is another opportunity
for value creation.
6. Invest in People and Skills: Chapter 2 gives a detailed approach for identifying the generic
and specialized skills based on the system type hurdles or symptoms. This can be based
on the OEM’s hurdles to see what skills to invest in to better complement the capability
at OEM’s.
It is much harder to give value capture recommendations because so much depends on the
specifics of the players and the situation. Disruption in mature industries is almost nonexistent
and the leading OEM’s are very stable. Still market capture shifts between the OEM’s is
possible. In addition, opportunities can and do arise for value capture for suppliers. Here are
some example opportunities for value capture:
1. Technology Spillover : such as the ICPS technology from the automotive into the power
generation industry. It will take a relatively long time for the established OEM’s to
incorporate a spillover that requires architectural innovation. In addition, other OEM’s
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who have not invested heavily or ”locked in” to a particular technology, can make a
significant leap by adopting a ready to go total integrated solution.
2. Ignored Installed Base: As new emission and efficiency regulations kick in, a huge number
of engines in the installed base will immediately not qualify. In some cases, the OEM’s
may ignore the installed base because their efforts are focused on the latest greatest
engine platform. Under these circumstances, the OEM may be happy to outsource the
full integrated system solution to third parties who would not be competing with internal
business units but helping them with what they perceive as less profitable and more
difficult work.
3. OEM Miscalculation: OEM’s are not infallible and do sometimes gamble on the wrong
technologies so that their new platform may not qualify the looming emission levels.
This kind of mistake is rare as the regulation cycles are known many years in advance
and as incremental technologies have a smaller risk. But the probability for a mainly
component supplier moving up to tier 1 integrated system solution provider is also rare.
So the supplier must take advantage of rare events by having ”real” options that can be
exercised quickly (i.e. fast time to market) once a rare opportunity arises, before reverting
eventually back to the status quo.
4. Advantages of Being Small : Suppliers, having survived continuous pressure to cut costs,
tend to have faster approaches with relatively lighter baggage. If they can avoid falling into
the trap of emulating the OEM, by for example blindly copying their elaborate processes,
and instead focus on architectural innovation, they stand a good chance of becoming a
top tier system integrator partner because they can help reduce the OEM’s heavy cost of
compliance with regulations, if not the overall size of the pie.
4.5 Conclusions on Technology Strategy
Becoming a top tier system integrator in the prime mover business is a very noble objective,
particularly since the OEM’s are gradually loosing their tacit knowledge or organizational ”fur-
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niture” as people retire and as other component suppliers are getting further pushed into the
corner of competing on price. But the path to this objective is full of caveats. Some of them
are due to the status quo and the extreme stability that rules in the mature safety critical
world where ”Predator/Prey” or ”Disruptive Technology” models do not apply. But others are
facets of resident component supplier culture that dominates because the majority of revenue
is coming from component sales.
For example, a knee jerk component oriented reaction to the emergence of the ICPS in
the automotive industry might be to acquire or bring in-house the capability to develop and
manufacture the ICPS component, in the hope of gaining at least a short term system integrator
advantage by being the only supplier with the ICPS in the power generation market. But this
relies on the best possible outcome of this move. One problem is that the ICPS component
may in fact not get massively adopted in the automotive industry despite an impressive early
emergence or adoption, as simulated by Struben’s System Dynamic model in figure 4-2 or by
Moore’s crossing the ”chasm” in figure 4-1. Not getting properly adopted in its home market
also reduces the probability that it will ever spill over into the power generation market. But the
other and possibly more significant issue is that the ICPS will not benefit from the cost effective
robust performance that successful adoption in the automotive industry would automatically
bring as explained in detail previously. Yet another caveat is that in both the automotive
and power generation, there typically emerges at least two or three dominant suppliers of
components so the advantage gained will be very short term. Some of these players like Bosch
operate in both markets and have some integrated system level capability. This type of supplier
is better positioned to engineer a spillover if the market turned out to be interesting for them.
A better strategy might be to focus on generating and capturing value at a higher integrated
system level that does not care who supplies the ICPS component. Rebecca Henderson’s [14]
and Jason Slagle’s[15] insights are very valuable here because they point to a particular high
value generation and capture domain, namely architectural innovation, in the conceptual and
preliminary design area with the target of delivering on robust performance that is a higher
level emergent property of interaction of components.
115
Another recommendation is to invest in the essential System Engineering skills and processes
that is missing in the supplier organization. This one is also not simple because one cannot
emulate the OEM’s for a couple of reasons. First, the OEM’s success is based on ”tacit”
knowledge and may not be repeatable elsewhere unless huge resources are expended to make
almost exact copies. This can kill the advantage of being small and lean. Second, the OEM’s
do not need much help or competition on what they do best, namely ”incremental innovation”.
So the skills and processes that are likely to create value and capture opportunities may be
related to but are not necessarily very similar to those of the OEM. Therefore blind copying of
the top notch integrated system solution suppliers is not directly fruitful. It would be helpful to
find out how a component supplier managed to cross over and what path they followed in the
targeted industry. However, if this was a recent move, why would they divulge the secret? If
this move happened a long time ago, they would not know explicitly what caused their success,
since the real factors are embedded in ”tacit” knowledge.
A better way to identify the required skills would be to detect the hurdles or existing
symptoms that are in the path of becoming a higher level integrator and use a framework like
that given in chapter 2 to discover the highest ranked general and specialized system design
and management skills that overcome these hurdles. This is more likely to succeed because
the skills are tailored to solving actual problems at hand versus blind copying of OEM’s or
strong opinions that solve an unknown or a different problem. This framework was based on
detailed response of 690 professionals with an average of 20 years work experience spread across
business, management and engineering functions.
Section 4.4 analyzes the System Integrator’s business model and gives a number of generic
strategic value generation and value capture recommendations that will improve the odds of
success of suppliers intending to move up the integrated system hierarchy.
4.6 The Bottom Line Conclusion
This thesis has covered a very wide range of socio-technical issues, from the emergence of
the ICPS technology in Chapter 1 to robust design compass in Chapter 2, to architectural
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evolution of the ICPS sensor and its system impact in Chapter 3, to technology adoption,
spillover triggers and strategic recommendations on how to move up the integrated system
solution hierarchy in Chapter 4. The big hurdles in real systems do not live in pure disciplinary
domains or individual divisions inside an organization. They live in a very different world that
emerges from the interaction between these elements inside and across organizations. This may
be counterintuitive for engineers who for example see one of the most complex and reliable
creation of man, the gas turbine, as a purely technical system, or commercial professionals
of suppliers who are mainly following the money not realizing that the key to their success
may come from establishing technical contact or planting seeds with the lower profile groups
at the OEM’s who are busy in the upfront conceptual or preliminary design phase of their
next generation platforms. Hence one needs to focus on a range of issues in the socio-technical
spectrum to find some answers when dealing with complex systems.
Each of the chapters in this thesis has its list of conclusions, and may be perceived as hitting
on ”too many notes” so to speak. But here is a couple of bottom line high level conclusions
that this thesis as a whole supports:
• The key to ensuring success in mature prime mover industries is the explicit understanding
of how to generate and capture the cost effective robust performance value that emerges
from the interaction of simpler socio-technical elements.
• An opportunity to learn from failures, or a good way to avoid them, is to gain structural
understanding of the dynamic causal loop relationship between the above value and the
value measured in dollars.
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